University of New Hampshire

University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository
Doctoral Dissertations

Student Scholarship

Winter 2006

Conflict and threat between pre-existing groups: An application of
identity to bias, persuasion and belief perseverance
Brian R. Laythe
University of New Hampshire, Durham

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/dissertation

Recommended Citation
Laythe, Brian R., "Conflict and threat between pre-existing groups: An application of identity to bias,
persuasion and belief perseverance" (2006). Doctoral Dissertations. 354.
https://scholars.unh.edu/dissertation/354

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship at University of New
Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more information, please contact
Scholarly.Communication@unh.edu.

CONFLICT AND THREAT BETWEEN PRE-EXISTING GROUPS: AN
APPLICATION OF IDENTITY TO BIAS, PERSUASION AND BELIEF
PERSEVERANCE

BY

BRIAN R. LAYTHE
B.A. Indiana University Southeast
M.A. University of New Hampshire

DISSERTATION

Submitted to the University o f New Hampshire
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor o f Philosophy
In
Psychology

December, 2006

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

UMI Number: 3241645

INFORMATION TO USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy
submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and
photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper
alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized
copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

®

UMI
UMI Microform 3241645
Copyright 2007 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company.
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest Information and Learning Company
300 North Zeeb Road
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

This dissertation has been examined and approved.

r^ T l

dUAs( \

_____________________________________

/j/lA.

YoM Biscoitft, dissertation Director, Assistant Professor o f Psychology.

Victor Benassi, Professor o f Psychology.
.f cW L ii-yr

----------------------------------------------------

Victoria BanyankvAssociafe Professor o f Psychology.

Gary Goldstein, Associate Professor o f Psychology.
^ V W __________________________ ____ _____________

Michael Middleton, Associate Professor of Education.

bkoh
Date7

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

DEDICATION

The author wishes to primarily dedicate this dissertation to his wife, Alexa Laythe, whose
patience, love, and support in daily life contributed as much to this dissertation as I did.
The author also wishes to dedicate this document to a long time friend, Benjamin Jones,
his grandmother, Helen Kirtley, and his parents, Robert and Marie Laythe, all of whom
have walked with me for many years through many storms and troubles. My deepest
gratitude goes to you all.

iii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge the assistance and effort on the part o f research assistants at
the University o f New Hampshire and the University o f Louisville. This dissertation
could not have been completed without the help of Talia Etedgee, Chuck Stinson, and
Lindsey Powell, who served difficult hours as actors for this research. I would also like
to thank Rosie Hutchinson for her assistance in group recruitment, Jeffery Skrowenck,
Victor Benassi, Michael Cunningham, and Toni Bisconti for their statistical advice, and
Benjamin Jones and Alexa Laythe for their editorial assistance. Finally, I wish to thank
the respective staffs of Indiana University Southeast, University of Southern Indiana, and
the University o f Louisville in their assistance with institutional permissions to conduct
research.

iv

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
DEDICATION....................................................................................................................iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS............................................................................................... iv
LIST OF TABLES............................................................................................................. vi
LIST OF FIGURES........................................................................................................... vii
ABSTRACT..................................................................................................................... viii

CHAPTER

PAGE

I. INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................1
II. METHOD..................................................................................................................... 45
III. RESULTS.....................................................................................................................56
IV. DISCUSSION..............................................................................................................99
REFERENCE NOTES.....................................................................................................131
LIST OF REFERENCES..................................................................................................132
APPENDICES..................................................................................................................141
APPENDIX A INTERPRETING HLM.......................................................................... 142
APPENDIX B PROTOCOL SCRIPTS........................................................................... 144
APPENDIX C APPARATUS..........................................................................................153
APPENDIX DIRB APPROVAL FORMS......................................................................167

v

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1. Means and Standard Deviations o f Relevant Variables by Condition........... 70

TABLE 2. Demographic Variables by College or University..........................................71

TABLE 3. Pearson Correlations o f Relevant Variables, Aggregate Sample....................72

TABLE 4. HLM and OLS Estimates o f Identity, Inclusion, and Source Toward
Predicting In-Group Bias................................................................................. 75
TABLE 5. HLM and OLS Estimates o f Identity, Inclusion, and Source Towards
Predicting Degree o f Argument Centered Statements......................................80
TABLE 6. HLM and OLS Estimates o f Identity, Inclusion, and Source Towards
Predicting Group Focused Statements............................................................. 83
TABLE7. HLM and OLS Estimates o f Identity, Argument % , Group %, Inclusion,
and Source Towards Predicting Negative Statements......................................87
TABLE 8. HLM and OLS Estimates o f Identity, Inclusion, and Source Towards
Predicting Residual In-Group Bias.................................................................. 96
TABLE 9. HLM and OLS Estimates o f Identity, Inclusion, and Source Towards
Predicting Residual Value............................................................................... 98

vi

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1. Figure o f the Interaction o f Identity and Source Towards
Predicting In-Group Bias............................................................................... 77
FIGURE 2. Figure o f the Interaction o f Identity and Source Towards
Predicting Negative Statements...................................................................... 89
FIGURE 3. Figure o f the Interaction o f Argument % and Inclusion
Towards Predicting Negative Statements.......................................................91
FIGURE 4. Figure o f the Interaction o f Argument % and Source
Towards Predicting Negative Statements.......................................................92

vii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ABSTRACT
CONFLICT AND THREAT BETWEEN PRE-EXISTING GROUPS: AN
APPLICATION OF IDENTITY TO BIAS, PERSUASION AND BELIEF
PERSEVERANCE
by
Brian R. Laythe
University o f New Hampshire, December, 2006
The current research examines the role of identity in the context of threat towards
further understanding bias, persuasion, and belief perseverance in what is defined as IRT
(Immediately Relevant Threat) conditions. Using pre, middle, and post measurements,
four groups of differing ideological student organizations across 4 university or college
campuses were presented critical messages that were varied by the source being either an
in-group or out-group presenter o f the message. Messages were also varied by either
presenting a message that criticized the entire group or only a few o f its members. With
the use o f hierarchical linear modeling and conventional ordinary least square statistics,
results indicated general and specific effects o f source o f the message and the
inclusiveness o f criticism towards predicting bias, persuasion, and belief perseverance in
environmental settings. Findings and their practical applications are discussed.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Imagine a coffee shop scenario where you witness two different social clubs
meeting over a recent issue that has occurred between them. Although polite at first, as
time passes you can see that things are not going well. Voices raise in harsh criticism of
past behavior, fists pound into the table, personal attacks are made, and suddenly the two
groups rise from the table and quickly go their separate ways. When you go over to ask
one of the conversants what went wrong, his simple reply is, “We didn’t see things the
same way; we were right, and they were wrong.” This scenario explained from social
identity (Tajfel & Tinner, 1979) or self- categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes,
Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) would suggest that hostility between groups is a result o f the
personal relevance o f the situation to each group’s sense of identity. More specifically,
each group’s sense o f social identity (i.e., the sense-of-self derived from group
membership) was threatened. In order to maintain a positive group image and group
identity, each group engaged in derogation of each other (Haslam & Wilson, 2000;
Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds, & Turner, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987).
The above scenario is a description of a realistic conflict situation, as opposed to early
conclusions derived from social identity, which represent findings from a laboratory
employing a variant of the minimal group paradigm (MGP; Brewer, 1979; Tajfel, Billig,
Bundy, & Flament, 1971). MGP was a laboratory design that created artificial in-groups
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(i.e., the group to which a participant belongs) and out-groups (i.e., the group to which
the participant does not belong) while controlling for environmental factors that usually
provide cues to an individual’s group membership. Because environmental group cues
were not present, the random assignment to a particular group represented the only cue
from which participants derived group identity (Bourhis, Sachdev, & Gagnon, 1994;
Tajfel et al., 1971). The results of these studies demonstrated significant in-group bias in
minimal conditions, supporting a theory that in-group bias requires little environmental
context (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel et al., 1971).
Subsequent examinations o f social identity from a self-categorization perspective
(Turner et al., 1987) have examined group membership with less stringent conditions
than MGP, generally allowing the social cues for which MGP controls. More
specifically, researchers allow for group categorizations such as nationality, gender, or
school membership (Haslam, Oakes, Turner, & McGarty, 1995; Oakes, Turner, &
Haslam, 1991) to examine in-group bias. Likewise, other researchers have examined
groups with specific ideologies and agendas (C risp, Hewstone & Cairns, 2001; Islam &
Hewstone, 1993), but these examinations represent broad religious groups, such as Islam,
or broad conceptions of the Hindu faith. None o f these identity studies or previous MGP
studies necessarily represent the natural association between an individual and a
personally chosen membership group, such as a club or professional organization.
Previous researchers have not examined the influence o f social identity within a realistic
and immediately relevant threat condition (e.g. Immediate and Relevant Threat, IRT). In
other words, bias and evaluations of threat messages have not been examined when (a)
in-group beliefs are based on personally and previously chosen participant membership,
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(b) the nature o f a presented message directly criticizes the personal behavior o f a target
group, increasing relevance, and (c) the evaluation and consequence o f a presented
message are immediate.
Personally chosen groups differ radically from laboratory MGP groups in that
the latter often uses a token or monetary exchange to determine favoritism (Brewer,
1979). Similarly, personally chosen groups are more specific than the broad
categorizations such as gender or nationality that represent large inclusive group
membership. Personally chosen groups often contain a specific set of ideals, norms, and
morays that promote a specific view o f the world, a specific agenda, and specific
expectations o f behaviors. In addition, most voluntary groups contain members who
have invested time and effort in their activities, and in turn are more committed to these
groups (Branscome, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). It is the voluntary investment in
a particular group with specific norms and beliefs that likely represent a more realistic
situation occurring in our social environment.
Similarly, messages that directly criticize the behavior o f target groups are in
stark contrast to previous research. For instance, previous research has examined in
group and out-group stances on messages of tangential importance (e.g., the right to die
for terminally ill patients, Mackie, Gastardo-Conaco, & Skelly, 1992; or road-safety
McGarty, Haslam, Hutchinson, & Turner, 1994), but do not explicitly examine direct
threat towards the good standing or good behavior o f a group. This negative threat
message is much more direct and personally relevant to a participant within a group
because the message impinges upon the reputation and standing o f the group in question.
As such, the personal applicability o f a threat message as described above, aside from

3
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being woefully more typical in genuine group conflicts, provides immediate relevance
towards evaluating and determining the potential consequences o f a message.
Finally, a message criticizing group behavior presented by another group of
similar standing provides immediate conflict and potential threat that, in theory, has
short-term consequences. For example, Van Knippenberg, Lossie, and Wilke, (1994)
studied advocacy versus non-advocacy of exams for college graduating seniors. The
consequences of advocating or not advocating for these exams would not affect the
participants for several months to several years. In contrast, by providing an immediate
and relevant threat, individuals within organizations are forced to immediately
contemplate the validity of the threat and understand that responses will have subsequent
short term consequences.
In essence, these conditions of an IRT scenario have not been thoroughly
examined by researchers interested in social identity and bias. The aim of the current
research is to examine realistic personal group interaction when the nature of the
interaction involves threat (i.e., negative appraisals of an in-group from another group).
We hope to explore two general avenues o f research that are related to an IRT condition.
First, we wish to generally examine the effect o f differing group ideologies towards the
inhibition or promotion of bias. Specifically, we are interested in whether or not
particular ideologies (e.g., norms, beliefs, and accepted behaviors towards others)
promote differing degrees of bias and the ways in which threat messages are processed.
Second, we examine the role o f in-group and out-group differentiation created within
relevant and personal threat, as well as the bias that is likely to result from predictions
postulated by self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987; Turner, 1975). We will also
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examine the relation of identity in regards to persuasion (McGarty, et al., 1994) within
IRT conditions, not only in the ability o f negative messaging to change in-group
attitudes, but also in terms of how in-groups process negative messages. We will
examine the persistence o f in-groups’ beliefs about their own group when presented with
a counter-attitudinal personally relevant message. Additionally, we examine the bias that
may persist as a result o f the initial assessments an in-group makes towards an out-group.
Theoretical Background: Personal and Social Identity
Social Identity Theory
Two o f the most prominently studied areas of human behavior involves the
influence of the group upon the individual and how groups interact with each other.
Early studies on group conflict between boys at summer camp (Sherif, 1956), in-groups
and out-groups as the cause of prejudice (Allport, 1954), and group conformity effects
(Asch, 1955) demonstrate the power o f a group towards both conformity and prejudice.
Henri Tajfel built upon these classic studies and subsequently presented a body of
research to which later developed as social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; See
Hogg & Abrams, 1999, for a historical review). Social identity theory (SIT) is a series of
premises maintaining that our sense o f self and behavior is partially derived from the
collective self (Hogg & Williams, 2000). More specifically, our affiliation with social
groups partially dictates our sense o f self and our behavior towards other groups. These
social affiliations correspond to our social identity, the parts o f the self dependent upon
social group context and affiliation. Conversely, SIT also proposes the construct of
personal identity, a sense o f self derived from personal qualities and interpersonal
relationships (Hogg & Abrams, 1999).
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According to SIT, the motivational component of in-group/out-group
classification is to maintain positive social identity that in turn promotes positive selfimage (Tajfel, 1981). It is assumed that social categories (e.g., nationality or ethnicity,
club membership, political or religious affiliations) provide a partial definition of whom
one is by providing behavioral, attitudinal, and evaluational norms (Haslam et al., 1999).
Because group memberships help to foster a positive self image, the evaluations of other
groups are often less favorable than evaluations o f the group to which an individual
belongs (Brewer, 1979; Hogg et al., 1995; Tajfel et al., 1971; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In
sum, SIT postulates that in-group bias occurs because people wish to maintain a positive
sense of self.
Self-Categorization Theory
Self-categorization theory (SCT; Turner et al., 1987) is a further development of
SIT that expands on the cognitive process o f self-categorization. SCT places emphasis
upon the process whereby judgments are made o f the similarity o f the group to which an
individual belongs in comparison to the differences o f characteristics o f another group
(Hogg et al., 1995; Turner, 1975). This comparison process provides an explanation of
when personal or group identity is relevant in social situations. According to Turner et
al. (1987), the process o f comparison of the similarities and differences between groups
results in depersonalization, or the tendency to abandon a personal sense o f self in order
to view the self as prototypically similar to other members of the group. This
depersonalization accentuates salient group identity (Hogg, Turner, & Davidson, 1990;
Turner et al., 1987; Turner, 1975; Turner, 1999). Thus, situations that are relevant to
group comparison result in individuals engaging their group identity, whereas situations
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that do not provoke group comparison do not result in individuals engaging in group
identity. The above statement reflects the salience o f the situation, or relevance of any
given situation for group identity. As situations vary within the social world, salience of
a group identity must also be examined in the environment. That is, in some situations, a
particular group membership may be an important factor in defining the self, but in other
cases it may not be as relevant (see Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1991, and Hogg & Turner, 1987, for
examples). Thus, SCT proposes that in-group/out-group formation is not static, but
unfolds in a situation-to-situation basis (Hogg et al., 1995; Turner, 1999).
Because salience is a crucial mechanism of SCT, the cognitive processes that
induce salience are important to understanding the theory. SCT explains the function of
salience within the context o f normative and comparative fit (Haslam & Turner, 1992;
Hogg & Turner, 1987; Oakes & Turner, 1986). With comparative fit, salience varies as a
function o f the comparison and relevance of the situation in terms o f an appropriate
comparison group (or groups). That is, group comparison is examined in the context of
having other relevant groups against which to compare (Haslam & Turner, 1992).
Essentially, in-group and out-group formation will occur when the differences between
the in-group and the targeted out-group are greater than the differences between other
additional out-groups (Haslam & Turner, 1992). For example, changing the number and
kind of countries to which Australian participants compared America resulted in different
degrees o f stereotypic traits. Specifically, Australians were biased towards Americans
when Americans were the only other group against which to compare. In contrast, when
other countries with very dissimilar characteristics from Australians were also present to
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compare, Americans were not seen as negatively (Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, &
Hayes, 1992; see also Haslam et al., 1995 for a similar experiment).
In contrast to comparative fit, normative fit represents the similarity or difference
between a group’s category specific beliefs and assumptions, in addition to the actual
data presented. In other words, do the beliefs held about a specific group match the
observed behavior o f the other group? For example, researchers examining normative fit
have shown that contrary behavior from the expected group norm produces differences in
participants’ attributions of that behavior. Behaviors are attributed as situational when
expected out-group behavior contradicts previous expectations, whereas behaviors are
attributed as personal when out-group behavior supports previous expectations (Oakes et
al., 1991). More importantly, behaviors that are contrary to in-group beliefs inhibit their
perception o f a conglomerate of individuals as a group. In the same study by Oakes et al.
(1991), an observer’s perception of group differentiation by sex role was highest when
groups o f men were disagreeing with groups o f women on a particular issue. In contrast,
perceived group differentiation was significantly less when members within the group
disagreed with each other.
In summation, SIT and SCT postulate a global theory for explaining group
differentiation. SIT mandates that group identity is important because it provides a sense
of worth to individuals. Because that sense of worth is important to an individual’s self
esteem, preferential treatment is given to groups to which we belong, whereas out-groups
may receive derogation in order to protect the group that provides us with worth. SCT
elaborates on the conditions o f group differentiation. Using comparative and normative
fit, group identity is relevant only when there is meaningful contrast (i.e., salience)
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between a group identity and an appropriate group(s) against which to compare. When
group membership is not relevant in an environmental situation, depersonalization and
group differentiation does not occur. Conversely, when a situation involves the status of
a group in context to other groups, these factors do occur and bias can result.
Social Identity. Threat, and Salience Within an Ecologically Valid Setting
The current study examines the role of identity and the consequences o f threat
within a realistic setting. Additionally, I examine several components and consequences
o f threat in order to provide comprehensive findings with realistic social conflict. The
first section examines a general question that overlies our specific examination o f bias,
persuasion, and belief persistence with regards to threat messages. Specifically, in what
way, if any, do pre-existing groups with personally chosen membership and pre-existing
ideologies and norms inhibit or promote bias in the context of SIT and SCT theories?
The essential goal of this question is to determine if groups of individuals who exhibit
specific beliefs, norms, attitudes, and biases will generally confound the principals of
salient contrast and subsequent ratings on bias and persuasion variables or if social
identity is a general mechanism to which all groups, regardless o f specific ideologies, are
subject.
Subsequent sections in the manuscript address the specific expected outcomes of
differing degrees o f salient contrast towards specific bias and persuasion variables in the
context o f threat. First, in-group bias will be examined as a result o f threat. Second,
attitude change in situations involving conflict between targeted in-groups and a
perceived representative from another group will be addressed. Specifically, we will
examine the persuasive effects o f a threat message and various ways that salience and
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group identity might alter how a personally relevant threat message is processed. In
addition to these factors, we address how in-groups may maintain bias, even after the
initial message that created bias has been recanted.
Regardless of the specific consequence o f threat and conflict that we examine,
group identity in respect to these variables dictates salience as the important mechanism
(Turner et al., 1987; Turner, 1999). In subsequent sections, we postulate that conditions
that alter the salience between groups not only exacerbate or lessen bias, but might also
apply to persuasion and belief perseverance, under the assumption that IRT conditions do
not represent a unique condition in which salience mechanisms may respond differently.
As research o f this specific nature has not been previously conducted, it may be the case
that previously researched mechanisms o f salience may produce different outcomes due
to IRT conditions. For instance, it may be the case that numerous environmental factors
associated with “live” confrontation and criticism, normally avoided in laboratory
studies, may confound or provide different mechanisms by which salience operates.
However, by assuming that previous research regarding salient contrast and bias applies
to IRT conditions, a comparison can be conducted between previous research and the
current study.
To that extent, we propose four specific factors, including group ideological
membership, identity, source of the message, and the degree that a message applies to the
number o f members in a group that hypothetically contribute to our three areas of
interest. First, we examine a more abstract influence o f salience by exploring the
possibility that group ideologies and norms may influence how an individual responds to
a threat message. Second, salience of a threat situation is hypothesized to be altered by
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the perceived group affiliation from which the threat comes. Specifically, threat
presented by a perceived in-group member should produce different outcomes than threat
presented by a perceived out-group member. Third, salience will differ in regards to the
degree of inclusiveness that the threat represents to the group. That is, threats that target
a few members o f a group will produce different outcomes than threats that target the
entire group. Fourth, salience o f a threat situation will differ depending on the amount of
personally invested identity with a particular group.
Ideological Differences as Precursors of Bias and Persuasion
When voluntary social groups are examined, it allows the opportunity to explore
a frequently neglected factor in social identity research. Although multiple researchers
have examined nationalities or group differences and the subsequent role of norms with
in-group bias, few researchers have examined the specific, pre-existing, and personally
chosen groups represented in an IRT scenario. Research using MGP makes ideology
irrelevant as the tendency to accentuate group differences was created within the context
o f newly created, non-invested groups (see Brewer, 1979, for a review). Likewise,
researchers who examine groups within the context o f other groups use non-voluntary
identity aspects such as gender (Oakes et al., 1991) or nationality (Haslam et al., 1995).
Although the above studies do represent global social groups, we suggest that
membership in groups such as gender or nationality represent a greater degree of
abstraction, or broader categorization (Turner et al., 1987) of group identity compared to
groups whose memberships represent a personal choice.
In order to examine ideology as a potential factor of identity and bias, additional
theorizing is necessary to justify its place within self-categorization theory. The idea that
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ideology might influence the degree o f bias created is dependent on differences between
norms (i.e., the shared beliefs, behaviors, and features o f a group) and how norms dictate
in-group/out-group interaction. The fundamental process with self-categorization
involves a processing of the norms of a given group. For instance, the process of
comparative and normative fit (Haslam & Turner, 1992) involves the comparison o f the
common beliefs, behaviors, and features o f an in-group compared to the expected
common beliefs, behaviors, and features o f an out-group. In other words, individuals
who perceive themselves as similar to a potential group evaluate that similarity on the
perceived norms o f the group in question. Applied to group interaction, it follows that
norms not only exist for beliefs about acceptable behavior within the in-group, but also
exist for dictating interaction with out-groups. These norms that dictate behavior towards
out-group members may be important within the context of how group belief and
ideology are expressed and promoted.
However, can differing norms and beliefs exacerbate or reduce negative feelings
towards groups who are similar or different from a group receiving a threat message?
Research suggests that the answer is yes, but several important caveats should be
considered. With regards to the group norms and influencing bias, the context o f social
identity research demonstrates that group held norms dictate interaction with out-groups
and in-group bias. Jetten, Spears, & Manstead (1996) demonstrated that in-group norms
such as fairness versus discrimination altered the degree o f bias produced in a classical
Tajfel allocation task. Specifically, after groups were labeled as detailperceivers they
performed a money allocation task to either detail perceivers or global perceivers.
Fairness and discrimination were manipulated by informing participants that 10 of the 15
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detail perceivers distributed money equally (fairness condition) or distributed money
predominantly to themselves. Results within this MGP variant demonstrated that groups
that had fairness as an in-group norm were significantly less biased in allocation, whereas
the greatest amount of bias occurred with in-group prejudice norms (but also see Jost &
Ross, 1999, for similar findings).
Although these findings demonstrate that group norms can influence bias, it is
also important to note that the theoretical principals of SCT propose that salient contrast
is an environmentally specific function (Turner et al., 1987). As such, salient contrast
and the principals of SIT should generally dictate bias and prejudice on a situation to
situation basis, and pre-existing entrenched individual group attitudes are only predictive
o f bias within these contrast conditions. For instance, Haslam and colleagues (1992)
showed that in-group bias was dependent on other groups that were considered more or
less favorable when determining bias towards a specific group. This theoretical
assumption is also strengthened by research showing that stereotype consensus within a
group and applicability o f stereotype beliefs contribute to in-group bias and favoritism
(Haslam et al., 1996, Haslam et al., 1999; Haslam & Wilson, 2000). Essentially, group
norms do influence bias, but are heavily influenced by categorical relevance, salient
contrast, and the universality of those norms.
The above findings establish the role of norms towards explaining intra-group
differentiation, but do not necessarily address attitudinal approaches towards bias. As an
example, attitudes and traits such as right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981; 1988)
or social dominance orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) have been
associated with prejudice and are expected to predict prejudice and bias on an individual
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level, but not as a function o f relevant group-contrast. Specifically, research regarding
social dominance orientation has been recently debated in social identity. Researchers
supporting a social dominance theory suggest that attitudes are pre-extant to salient
contrast (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), whereas SCT researchers support the mechanism of
salient contrast as a precursor to attitudinal biases (Tinner & Reynolds, 2003).
Researchers examining this question have shown that in particular (at least with SDO), a
relationship between bias and social dominance does not occur when identity with a
particular group is not invoked, but does relate when individuals are provided contrast in
terms of identity groups (Schmitt, Branscombe, & Kappen, 2003, Wilson & Liu, 2003,
but also see Haslam & Wilson, 2000). Thus, the overall answer to this debate suggests
that pre-existing attitude traits are predictive of prejudice and bias, but only when
participants are cognitively made aware o f themselves verses others.
In context o f the current study, we wish to explore the possibility that within
salient contrast between groups, as IRT should create, pre-existing and group specific
held beliefs and norms may potentially influence bias. In other words, do norms
representing different group beliefs inherently contain more o f a disposition for hostility
or bias towards similar and different groups? For example, is it the case that two groups
with very differing ideologies (i.e., a fraternity compared to a Christian religious group)
when presented with the exact same threat message, will report different degrees of bias
because o f inherent norms and beliefs of a particular organization?
The answer to this question provides one o f two potentially interesting outcomes
in the context of SCT and salient contrast. Should a lack of differences between differing
ideologies (e.g., advocacy groups as opposed to religious groups) occur, then these
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findings would further support the current understanding o f SCT, in the sense that
regardless o f specific ideological norms, bias and evaluation o f threatening groups are
general social functions of salient contrast and the maintenance of self-esteem of its
group members (e.g. Turner et al., 1987, Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Similarly, these
findings would also support the conception of previous research between religion and
prejudice that suggests it is not the specific beliefs themselves that contribute to
prejudice, but rather the militant way in which beliefs are held and maintained (Laythe,
Finkel, & Kirkpatrick, 2001; Laythe, Finkel, Bringle, & Kirkpatrick, 2002). In other
words, the specific ideology does not seem to dictate prejudice, but a need to maintain
and enforce these beliefs do. In contrast, should differences in bias and persuasion occur
due to differing types o f groups, results would lend more specific support to a “triggered
trait theory” as demonstrated by Schmitt et al. (2003) and Wilson and Liu (2003). In
essence, specific norms or types o f beliefs do in fact generate more bias than others, at
least in the context of salient contrast as our IRT conditions are expected to produce.
These findings would suggest that specific norms held by specific types o f groups do
promote ideologies o f superiority within an individual’s group as a whole, and in turn, as
individuals identify with that group, they engage in those norms when dealing with other
groups.
Identity and In-Group Bias in Response to Threat Situations
Previous research has examined bias as a result of inter-group comparison
(Haslam et al., 1995). Researchers have also contrasted the effects o f comparative and
normative fit as a prerequisite for salient contrast (Oakes et al., 1991). However, to date,
researchers have not addressed the conditions of salient contrast when there is an actual
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personally relevant threat between two groups. In order to examine realistic conflict and
the threat associated with it, we apply our proposed salience factors to in-group bias
when the nature of group interaction is designed to be critical o f the in-group. As a
result, we examine both traditional findings in bias research, as well as some exceptions
that might result because of IRT conditions.
Source and Degree of Threat as Factors of In-Group Bias
When a situation involves threat, the source of the threat message as either an in
group or out-group member may alter how the threat is received according to SCT
principals of comparative and normative fit (Reynolds, Turner, & Haslam, 2000).
Previous researchers suggest that threat will generally produce comparative fit if the
source o f a threat message is an out-group member. Logically, when two groups are
presented as dissimilar to each other, in-group bias seems likely given previous research
using MGP (Tajfel et al., 1971) that has demonstrated in-group bias under conditions that
minimize group identity. Likewise, comparative fit is easily induced by only providing a
specific out-group against which to compare, unlike Haslam et al., (1992) who purposely
altered the number o f group comparisons. Thus, for the current situation that openly
creates conflict, comparative fit and subsequent differentiation should be relatively easy
to establish for in-group members (Haslam et al., 1992; Oakes et al., 1991). Normative
fit, on the other hand, may play a significant role when a threat comes from a perceived
in-group member. More specifically, group criticism may be expected from another
group with potentially different agendas and goals, but threat coming from a perceived
in-group member is inconsistent with the idea o f what an in-group member should
believe. As an example, Oakes and colleagues (1991), in an experimental manipulation
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pitting arts students versus science students, demonstrated the importance o f normative
fit when producing salient contrast between in-groups and out-groups. Specifically, these
researchers found that arts students who produced inconsistent expected views about a
given issue had their views explained by internal attributions (e.g., personality) by
science students as opposed to external attributions (e.g., group influence). When the
other group’s views were inconsistent with expected stereotypes, less group cohesion was
perceived, and as a consequence, less comparative fit between groups occurred. As a
result, the salient contrast between groups lessened (Oakes et al., 1991).
In essence, Turner et al. (1987) proposes that comparative and normative fit is the
mechanism o f group differentiation and subsequent bias. In turn, Oakes et al. (1991)
demonstrated that a lack of normative fit inhibited comparative fit. Thus, one
interpretation o f this research suggests that less normative fit results in less contrast, and
subsequently less bias. In conjunction with these findings, we suggest that normative fit
will be less when threat is presented by an in-group member. A message that is counterattitudinal to an in-group presented by a member who is supposed to be similar creates a
conflict between expectations of in-group beliefs and the views actually espoused.
There are however, exceptions to this rule when the nature of the message
involves criticism. For instance, Moreland and McMinn (1999) demonstrated that ex
members of a particular group who criticized completed projects by the in-group created
more distress and rejection compared to criticism from an unrelated group (i.e., out
group). Other researchers (see Hornsey & Imani, 2004 for a general review) have
demonstrated that criticism from in-group members tends to be severe towards in-group
members who do not conform (Abrams, Marques, Bown, & Henson, 2000) or are
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disloyal (Branscombe, Wann, Noel, & Coleman, 1993). Taking the above research into
account within an IRT scenario where direct criticism is applied to group behavior, it is
possible that a “black sheep effect” (Homsey & Imani, 2004, p 366, but also see
Hornsey, Oppes, & Svensson, 2002) might occur. In other words, a sense of betrayal
stemming from the presentation of criticism from another organization with similar
ideologies and beliefs (i.e., an in-group) may in fact produce more bias, than from an
out-group where criticism is perhaps more expected.
In essence, the general theoretical mechanisms of SCT would suggest that
messages from an in-group member will generate less bias than an out-group member.
However, other research demonstrates a “black sheep effect”, or the result o f betrayal of
an in-group by a particular member. Given the concept of IRT conditions as a threat
condition (e.g., criticism; Moreland & McMinn, 1999), either effect could be likely,
depending on how severely participants perceive and interpret the message. If
participants find the criticism tolerable, stimulating favorability towards an in-group
member, bias could be lessened, as Oakes and colleagues (1991) describe. In contrast, if
the criticism is seen as severe, a black sheep effect seems more likely. As a tentative
hypothesis we expect the former to occur, but leave open the possibility that the latter is
also probable. Thus, following Oakes et al, (1991), we would expect that lesser degrees o f
salience in an in-group presented message, in part due to poor normative fit, will
produce less bias compared to an out-group presented message.
A secondary issue with salience represents the degree of threat that another group
or individual presents to an in-group. Previous research has treated threat as a condition
that is either present or absent. For instance, Spears, Doosje, and Ellemers (1997) used
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psychology, art, and physics majors as existing groups and had these groups compare
specific traits, such as intelligence or creativity. Threat was defined as a challenge to
status by comparing groups that perceived themselves as disadvantaged when compared
to a specific trait (e.g., psychology students compared to art students on creativity). In
this example, creativity represents an evaluative trait in which art majors are perceived as
more advantaged compared to psychology majors. As a result, psychology majors
perceive threat because o f their disadvantaged status (also see Ellemers, Spears, &
Doosje, 2002; Branscombe et al., 1999; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1999). Although
these findings establish the validity o f threat as a reaction to an out-group, they do not
address the possibility that the degree of threat might also alter the reaction. In the above
example, threat is a specific trait that is not varied in its severity or application.
Likewise, Spears et al. (1997) do not address how psychology students would rate art
students if they were addressed as slightly more creative compared to extremely more
creative. In sum, threat researchers have not directly manipulated the degree o f threat
presented by a threat message.
Under the assumption that threat towards an in-group produces salient
comparison conditions that can produce bias (Spears et al., 1997), there is evidence to
suggest that the degree o f threat presented alters the amount of in-group bias produced.
This proposition is based upon research examining how well traits or attributes fit a
particular in-group or out-group. Reynolds et al. (2000) recently demonstrated that
typicality (i.e., to what degree traits apply to the whole group) o f positive traits resulted
in more in-group bias. Specifically, less attributions of negative traits were assigned to
out-groups when the particular negative trait was not typical of either in-groups or out-
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groups. Likewise, overall discrimination was less when traits were not typical of any
given group. Applied to a content message that is threatening to members o f an in-group,
these findings suggest that one method of varying the degree of threat is to alter the
degree that a particular threat is applicable to group members. We propose that the
degree to which a threat applies to all or few members o f an in-group will produce
different amounts of bias. In a threat situation where only a few members of a group are
criticized, it is more likely that overall members o f the group would not consider these
accusations typical to the group as a whole. Similarly, the supposed negative behaviors
of a few members o f a particular group can be dismissed as behavior induced by
situational circumstances (Crisp et al., 2001), in turn reducing any perceived threat to the
in-group. Conversely, threat that applies to all the members of the group should establish
greater degrees of bias, because of its applicability to every member o f the group. Thus,
we would expect that low inclusion threat conditions (i.e., few members) will produce
less bias than high inclusion conditions (i.e., all members).
Within Group Identity as a Factor of In-Group Bias
Although we propose that the overall inclusion o f threat is a potential source of
in-group bias, the overall level o f identification with a particular group by its members
would also alter individual perceptions of bias. One of the central themes when
examining groups’ reactions to threat involves the reaction to threat as either high or low
identifiers within an in-group (Branscombe et al., 1999; Spears et al., 1999). High
identifiers within a group are more prone to exhibit depersonalization and in-group bias,
whereas low identifiers exhibit depersonalization only to the extent that it furthers group
and, indirectly, personal status improvement (Doosje, Spears, & Ellmers, 2002; Spears et
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al., 1997). These findings lead us to expect that the salience of threat will differ for
individuals with a high degree o f investment or personal meaning placed within a group,
versus group members who do not place a great degree o f investment within the group.
In conjunction with the level of inclusion of threat, we propose that a threat condition that
includes the group as a whole (i.e., high inclusion) will be less threatening and create less
in-group bias with low identity members as opposed to high identity members (Doosje et
al., 2002; Spears et al., 1997). Likewise, we expect that in low inclusion threat
conditions (i.e., threat targeting a few members), threat will be significantly less than our
more inclusive threat condition for low identity members.
This expectation is based on the premise o f prototypicality, or the degree that
group members perceive themselves as similar. Previous research demonstrates that high
identifiers are more likely to perceive the group as more similar to themselves than low
identifiers (Ellemers et al., 2002). Because we expect greater prototypicality from high
identifiers, it is logical to assume that individuals who have high degrees of investment
and commitment in a group will perceive criticism towards a few members of the group
in the same way as threat that encompasses the whole group. A threat against a few
members still represents personal threat against their own identity because threats to
others within the in-group are perceived as threats to themselves (Simon, Pantaleo, &
Mummendey, 1995; Spears et al., 1997). Conversely, low identifiers do not perceive
themselves as necessarily similar to others in the in-group. As a result, threat towards
other members of the group do not personally apply to low identifiers and can be
personally ignored. In sum, different degrees o f threat inclusion should produce differing
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degrees o f bias fo r low identity members, but will not significantly alter high identifiers ’
ratings o f bias.
Identity and the Response to Threatening Information;
Persuasion and Belief Perseverance.
In the previous section we discussed how several factors might contribute to the
creation of in-group bias, but did not address how in-group bias is formed. In the current
section, we demonstrate the relationships between bias, persuasion, and previously held
beliefs. The application of these three areas of research implies three general questions
about attitude change and identity. First, does group identity alter how people
cognitively process threat information? Second, as a result of that processing, what
contrast exists between attitude change about the out-group compared to attitude change
about the in-group? Finally, once a judgment has been made about the content o f a
message and the group that provides it, can these judgments be changed when the
conditions and information that made the judgments accurate are recanted?
In order to examine these questions, research from both persuasion and belief
perseverance are particularly important. Researchers who examine persuasion provide
evidence for examining how negative messages are processed both in and out of the
context of group identity. Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986) Elaboration Likelihood Model
allows us to examine differences in how negative messages are cognitively processed and
resultant attitude changes. In contrast, research by Anderson and Lindsay (1998)
provides a model for how individuals persist in their individual beliefs and the conditions
necessary to counter that persistence. Evidence for why beliefs persist can explain why
attitudes about the in-group may not change when given negative information. Likewise,
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belief perseverance literature can address our final question about the negation of bias
and the attitudes about the in-group and out-group that result from threat. In the
following sections, we address the theoretical background behind persuasion and belief
perserverance, the unique conditions created with group identity in a conflict/threat
situation, and an elaboration o f our three questions.
Theoretical Background: Persuasion and Belief Perseverance
Persuasion
According to the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986),
persuasion is a function of involvement and message quality. When individuals find that
a message is personally relevant to them they engage in central processing, or a careful
scrutiny o f the content o f a message in terms o f its merits and faults. The result o f central
processing is that high quality arguments are more persuasive than low quality
arguments. Conversely, if a message is not processed centrally, ELM states that
peripheral processing occurs. That is, the audience does not pay attention to the content
o f the argument, but takes persuasive cues from the persuader, the environment of the
room, or previously established norms (Petty, Cacioppo, & Schumann, 1983; Petty &
Cacioppo, 1990).
According to ELM, the variable of importance that determines whether central or
peripheral processing occurs is personal relevance, or the degree of involvement with a
persuasive topic. Individuals who are involved with a persuasive message engage in
greater degrees o f central processing than those who are not involved with a persuasive
topic (Petty et al., 1983). For instance, Petty and Cacioppo (1979) demonstrated that
conditions where a message was considered highly relevant and important produced more
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scrutiny and analysis of the argument compared to conditions where the message content
was not perceived as personally relevant. In contrast, when personal relevance is low,
other peripheral persuasive cues become important in processing information. For
instance, Heesacker, Petty, and Cacioppo (1983) found that the perceived credibility of a
source is more influential to persuasion when individuals do not perceive a message as
personally relevant. Specifically, the peripheral cue o f credibility was more persuasive
than the quality of the argument when individuals were not motivated to scrutinize the
message because o f its lack o f relevance. In sum, the greater the involvement, the more
careful the scrutiny of the argument. Conversely, the less involved an individual is in a
particular topic, the more likely non-argument based assessment occurs (Petty &
Cacioppo, 1984).
Belief Perseverance
In contrast to persuasion, which represents changes in opinions and belief, belief
perseverance is the tendency to maintain beliefs even when contrary evidence is
provided. The perseverance o f belief is the final stage in maintaining previously
developed naive theories, or knowledge structures that assume causal relations between
people, things, or events (Anderson & Lindsay, 1998). It is our naive theories about
social events (i.e., the causal relations we assume about groups) that fuel our attitudes
about particular groups. Thus, our expectations derive our attitudes (Anderson, 1995a,
1995b; Anderson & Lindsay 1998). As an example of how differing naive theories alter
our perceptions of events, Sedikides and Anderson (1992) demonstrated that individuals’
explanations about a defector radically differed as a function of whether or not the
defector was described as American or Soviet. Specifically, Soviet defectors were
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perceived by Americans as oppressed and noble, whereas American defectors were seen
in a negative context.
According to Anderson and Lindsay, (1998) the perseverance o f beliefs occurs as
a function of several criteria. First, the individual will persevere in his or her beliefs if
time, cognitive resources, and/or motivation are not available. In other words, time and
resources must favor the analysis o f a competing naive theory, but motivation must also
exist to examine previously held beliefs. If these conditions are not met, the previously
held belief will persevere. However, even if time, resources, and the motivation are
available to examine a previously held belief, subsequent research has demonstrated that
several cognitive biases may still occur. These cognitive biases result from the causal
nature o f the naive theory that is previously held. For instance, Slusher and Anderson
(1987) demonstrated that participants will overestimate the frequency o f associations of
word pairs that promote a previously held naive theory. Likewise, individuals will often
distort data to match their previously held theories (e.g., Sedikides & Anderson, 1992).
Researchers have also demonstrated that individuals who produce arguments or
justification for their beliefs tend to be resilient to belief change (Anderson, 1983). The
result o f these studies suggests that within social situations the examination o f an
alternate theory does not necessarily mean an unbiased examination of new information.
Identity and Bias. Persuasion, and Belief Perseverance Applied to Realistic Threat
In the previous section we discussed four factors (i.e., group ideology, identity,
source o f the message, and message inclusion) that we propose induce different degrees
o f salience between groups and the resultant in-group bias that can occur. In order to
examine how the same salience factors apply to our inquiries about persuasion and
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attitude change, it is necessary to address three important theoretical questions. The first
question involves how factors that influence in-group bias likely affect how individuals
process information. Answering this question allows us to examine persuasion with the
use of factors that affect salience and create in-group bias. The second question asks
which unique conditions occur when persuasion is applied to threat of an in-group’s
sense of personal value. The third question addresses the issue of negative persuasion, or
the effect a counter-attitudinal message has on listeners. Elaboration on this question
defines the conditions that are unique to the current experiment with regards to the
persuasive ability o f threat.
To address the relationship between bias and persuasion it is important to
demonstrate three connections between in-group norms, naive theories and judgment.
First, the construction o f naive theories and the causal relationships derived from them
are in part derived from group membership. More specifically, identity, or sense o f self
in regards to the environment, is developed by the interplay of affiliation with groups to
which one does and does not belong (Hogg & Turner, 1987). Affiliation is then dictated
by the similar and dissimilar norms and characteristics o f any particular group
comparison. Second, if in-group norms can be considered naive theories, then they are
used to create judgments about social situations (Anderson, 1995a, 1995b). Adherence to
the norms o f an in-group provides a sense o f belonging, as well as common naive
theories that result in positive or negative attitudes about other groups. Thus, similarities
between in-group members and differences between out-group members are judged as a
function o f the assumptions that a group holds (Anderson, 1995a, 1995b; Turner et al.,
1987). Finally, cognitive processing is the resultant process that occurs when individuals
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judge other groups. The evaluation of a persuasive message is a process that examines
whether it is pro-attitudinal or counter-attitudinal, and subsequently is elaborated on for
its merits either by scrutinizing the argument itself or contextual information (Petty &
Cacioppo, 1986). Within the context of group affiliation, the content o f a message as
pro-attitudinal or counter-attitudinal is gauged by the norms of the group with which a
person is affiliated. A judgment is made about the message, and sometimes the presenter
of the message, as a result of this elaboration.
The logical conclusion o f these points suggests that any resultant judgment is a
process o f cognitive elaboration based on naive theories to which an in-group adheres.
In-group bias represents a judgment of another group’s qualities as inferior to the in
group. As a result, our above consideration o f naive theories and cognitive elaboration
apply to the judgments involving in-group bias and dictate that conditions creating bias
first alter the cognitive processing that allows individuals to come to a negative
conclusion about another group.
Our second question involves explaining what is unique about our threat
conditions within the current study. The current study seeks to ascertain the degree to
which group-members persist in their beliefs about the “goodness” o f their particular
group. Generally, previous researchers have examined persuasion when the content of
the message does not directly address the value of the group itself (e.g., Petty &
Cacioppo, 1979, Petty, Rennier, & Cacioppo, 1987). Likewise, research that involves in
group persuasion does not invoke a persuasive message that is counter to the relevance
and value of the group (e.g., McGarty et al., 1994). Although a particular attitude about a
specific persuasive message may differ between groups, the resultant attitude change only

27

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

represents one specific naive theory that a group holds. In contrast, by questioning the
overall value o f the group, a global threat is produced to a groups’ status and standing.
Thus, the current study is interested in the persuasive ability of a message that questions
an in-group’s sense of worth and standing in a social context. Although we believe that
addressing individual naive theories that in-groups hold would produce different degrees
of cognitive processing and potential bias, we have “stacked the deck” so to speak. By
focusing the content of the persuasive message towards criticizing the group’s value, we
exacerbate the relevance o f the message for an in-group. In turn, alterations of the
strength o f the threat message by differing conditions that alter salience should produce
different cognitive processing by in-groups.
Finally, because the nature of our experiment involves presenting counterattitudinal messages to in-groups, it is important to realize that counter-attitudinal
messages are processed differently than pro-attitudinal messages, regardless of group
membership. For instance, Cacioppo and Petty (1979) demonstrated that levels of
persuasion and neutral thoughts about a counter-attitudinal message are significantly less
than a pro-attitudinal message. Conversely, counter arguments tend to be greater with
counter-attitudinal messages. Similarly, when examining the degree of involvement with
a persuasive message, Petty and Cacioppo (1979) found that investment within a
particular belief produces greater degrees o f negative attitudes and greater degrees of
arguments against the counter-attitudinal message. These examinations of negative
messaging suggest that threat messages towards an in-group are not received well,
produce less persuasion than pro-attitudinal messages, but are contemplated more than
pro-attitudinal arguments. As a result o f these findings, it is important to note that an
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examination of threat within the context o f persuasion is an examination o f what
conditions produce the most anti-persuasion. Our experiment examines both central and
peripheral processing in regards to how much in-groups are persuaded by a threat
message. We discuss specific cognitive processing predictions below.
Identity and Threat Message Processing: Central or Peripheral?
In our examination of persuasion and salient contrast within IRT conditions, we
first examine two variables that could individually or jointly contribute to the positive or
negative evaluation of a critical message. The essence of the following examination of
central and peripheral processing is that both salient contrast invoked by manipulations of
source and inclusion, as well as individual participant’s degrees o f central or peripheral
processing, will contribute to positive or negative responses towards an IRT message. In
other words, individual (and not condition determined) measures o f central and
peripheral processing in the current study are defined as individual random variables.
Each participant within a specific organization will process a threat message on an
individual basis. In turn, positive and negative responses are expected to vary as a
function of either central or peripheral processing. We expect that this relationship is
further influenced by group applied salience manipulations in terms of source and
inclusion. These manipulations will further contribute to central and peripheral
processing of participants within groups and towards predicting positive and negative
outcomes.
Research examining persuasion often demonstrates differing outcomes based on
positive or negative elaborations made about a particular manipulated condition. Initial
studies performed by persuasion researchers (e.g. Petty & Cacioppo, 1979 but also see
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Cacioppo & Petty, 1979) examined attitude change in the context o f directly
manipulating conditions of persuasion that were later defined as central and peripheral
approaches. For example, Cacioppo and Petty (1979) altered involvement in the message
as either high or low and used the subsequent differences in the amount of positive and
negative statements made to demonstrate a peripheral or central approach to argument
analysis. These findings involving personal relevance as a manipulation provide evidence
o f processing differences by examining the attitudinal outcomes of the statements made
by participants. The summation of this research demonstrates (as a general principal)
that as peripheral processing increases, negative statements increase for arguments (Petty
& Cacioppo, 1979; Petty, et al., 1983). These findings make sense in the context of
identity and salient contrast, in that negative responses represent a lack o f persuasion,
whereas positive responses represent favorable reaction to a message, and can be
construed as favorable or persuasive outcome o f the message on participants. One o f the
general assumptions following our expectations fo r positive and negative responses
regards the above findings, in that we would expect in a realistic threat scenario that
central processing will be inversely related to the amount o f negative statements
producedfrom an argument (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979; Petty et al., 1983).
As such, the evaluation of positive and negative responses in an IRT scenario
provide the overall evaluation and validity of a threat message. However, there are
alternate assumptions with regards to central and peripheral processing and the likely
positive or negative outcomes that occur from processing a threat message. Our current
assumption for the above hypothesis is that a participant engaging in peripheral
processing could assess the message using previous assumptions, and in turn rate a threat
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the group (4.09 versus 2.09, r(l,179) = 6.41 p = .000). Additionally, participants
perceived the statement applying to everyone in the group in the low inclusion condition
compared to the high inclusion condition (2.73 versus 1.95, /( l,179) = 2.61,/j = .01).
Both o f these findings, although very low scores in terms o f range, suggest that
the nature of the message applying to only a few members compared to all o f the
members o f a target group was perceived and a “perceived typicality” effect took place
(e.g. Reynolds et al., 2000). In essence, participants were less willing to accept the
group’s responsibility for the message when the threat applied to everyone in the group.
In contrast, the accusation o f only a few members was more readily accepted, providing
evidence that high and low inclusion conditions were differently perceived.
Results Overview
For each of our principal analyses regarding in-group bias, persuasion variables,
and persistence of bfas, preliminary subject level ANOVAs were conducted. The goal of
these analyses are to test our exploratory hypotheses involving naturally occurring
differences in bias and persuasion due to the type of group to which individuals have
invested identity. These analyses were conducted before HLM analyses to determine if
additional variables should be included in the model to account for consistent differences
in scores due to group type.
Following these ANOVAS, preliminary HLM model testing is reported, which
determines the goodness of fit by comparing the variance explained by the unrestricted,
predictor only, and predictors and manipulation HLM models. In addition, the amount of
subject and group level variation of the dependent variable is reported, and this variation
is tested to determine if sufficient between group variation exists to conduct a subjects
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nested within groups HLM model. The addition of an Inclusion X Source interaction
term is also tested against the principal results model to determine if an interaction of
these two Level-2 predictors is relevant to the principal model. Lastly, results are
reported for the final HLM model used to test the hypotheses outlined in the introduction.
These hypotheses are repeated in an introductory paragraph. A brief tutorial on
interpreting HLM output is provided in Appendix A.
Results Section 1: HLM Models of In-Group Bias
Descriptive Statistics: Aggregate Sample
In order to provide general relationships with the overall sample and descriptive
statistics for each college or university sub-population, Table 1 provides dependant
variables of interest separated by manipulation. Table 2 provides demographic
information separated by college or university sampled. Table 3 provides sample
correlations between dependent variables for the aggregate sample.
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TABLE 1

Condition
N Group Type
Low Inc In-Group
20 Fraternity
9 Religious
14 Sorority
Aggregate
Low Inc Out-Group
20 Fraternity
12 Religious
7 Advocacy
Aggregate
High Inc In-Group
49 Sorority
5 Religious
6
Advocacy
Aggregate
High Inc Out-Group
27 Fraternity
5 Religious
6
Advocacy
Aggregate

RESBIAS

NEGPER

ARGPER

GRPPER

-4.31 (3.51)
-1.84 (1.87)
-2.52 (2.50)
-2.89

-2.59(3.03)
-1.44(1.60)
-0.75(2.30)
-1.59

0.38(0.33)
0.25(0.30)
0.23(0.31)
0.29

0.57(0.36)
0.48(0.26)
0.61 (0.30)
0.55

0.28(0.31)
0.55(0.26)
0.70(0.32)
0.51

-3.88 (1.93)
-2.16 (2.30)
-2.91 (1.71)
-2.98

-2.66(2.13)
-1.20(2.49)
-1.67(1.78)
-1.84

0.39(0.35)
0.28(0.26)
0.45(0.18)
0.37

0.58(0.25)
0.67(0.11)
0.63 (0.21)
0.63

0.46(0.32) 1.05 (2.70) -0.05 (2.48) 4.99 (1.23)
0.48(0.27) -0.46 (1.87)-1.29 (2.97) 5.27 (1.36)
0.43(0.24) -2.42 (1.90)-1.14 (1.57) 4.89 (1.32)
0.45
-0.60
-0.82
5.05

-6 . 1 2 (2.47)
-1.97 (2.15)
-3.74 ( 1 .0 2 )
-3.94

-2.90(2.37)
-1.12(0.77)
-2.86(1.16)
-2.29

0.59(0.30)
0.26(0.24)
0.60(0.26)
0.48

0.53 (0.25)
0.71 (0.22)
0.62(0.13)
0.62

0.36(0.25)
0.52(0.30)
0.26(0.16)
0.38

0.31 (1.57) 0.27(1.55) 5.06(0.98)
-1.20 (1.64)-0.20 (0.84) 5.10 (1.59)
-1.07 (1.42)-1.40 (2.26) 5.00 (0.68)
-0.65
-0.31
5.07

-4.25 (2.39)
-6.93 (2.56)
-4.96 (1.53)
-5.38

-3.05(2.46)0.33(0.34)
-4.36(1.05)0.28(0.38)
-0.38 (2.48) 0.61 (0.25)
-2.59
0.41

0.67(0.36)
0.46(0.31)
0.41 (0.27)
0.51

0.45(0.34)
0.42(0.21)
0.41 (0.27)
0.43

-0.67 (1.49)-0.26 (1.50) 5.00 (1.26)
-1.40(1.67)-1.40(2.40) 4.10(1.94)
-0.17 (0.41) -0.67 (1.21) 6.08 (0.99)
-0.74
-0.78 5.06

BIAS

VALUE

RESVALUE IDENTITY

-0.55 (2.61)-0.90 (2.19) 4.88(1.07)
-0.22(1.30) 0.00(1.50) 5.25(1.08)
-0.71 (1.54) 0.21 (1.12) 5.01(1.14)
-0.49
-0.23
5.05

Note: BIAS = Manipulation bias score; RESBIAS = Bias score after message negation; NEGPER: Percent of total negative statements
made; ARGPER = Percent of total argument focused statements; GRPPER = Percent of total statements that focus on participant’s group;
VALUE = Participants perceived value of group; RESVALUE = Participant perceived value of group after message negation; IDENTITY
= Participant’s identity score.
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Means and Standard Deviations o f Relevant Variables by Condition

TABLE 2

Variables
Sample Size
Relevant Means
Age
Relevant Percentage Of.
Females
Males
Freshmen or Sophomores
Juniors or Seniors
Caucasians
Attends Most or All Meetings
Members 1 Year or More

Site 1

Site 2

Site 3

Site 4

127

34

14

5

20.03(1.51)

21.76 (7.44)

20.50(1.69)

20.8 (.83)

45.0%
55.0%
57.5%
42.5%
96.0%
1 0 0 .0 %
82.7%

47.1%
52.9%
35.3%
64.7%
97.1%
8 8 .2 %
73.5%

.%
. %
50.0%
50.0%
1 0 0 .0 %
1 0 0 .0 %
57.1%

80.0%
. %
0 .0 %
1 0 0 .0 %
1 0 0 .0 %
1 0 0 .0 %
1 0 0 .0 %

100 0

0 0

20 0
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Demographic Variables by College or University

TABLE 3

Variables

1

2

1.Bias
2.Residual Bias
3.Negative %
4.Argument %
5.Group %
6 .Value Diff
7.Residual Value Diff
8 .Identity

1

.62**
1

3

4

5

6

7

-.36**

.18*
.07
-.33**

.18*

-.07
-.07

-.05
-.05
.09

- .1 1
1

1

.1 1
44

- .0 2

1

-.04
.03

_ **
.41**

1

.0 0

-.05
.51**
1

8
-.23**
-.1 0
.1 0
- .1 0

-.07
- .0 1
- .0 1
1
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Pearson Correlations o f Relevant Variables, Aggregate Sample

Preliminary Analyses of Bias Group Differences
In order to examine potential differences in in-group bias due to the type of group
(e.g. Fraternity, Sorority, Religious Group, or Advocacy), a series o f one-way ANOVAs
were conducted within each manipulation type. Tukey post-hoc tests were employed to
determine any consistent differences o f bias between individual groups within
manipulations. The only significant ANOVA was in the high inclusion/in-group
manipulation (F(2,57) = 8.946, p < .000). Subsequent examination o f the groups within
this condition indicated that a religious group demonstrated significantly more bias in
comparison to other groups (-6.13 versus -3.74 and -1.98,p 's < .05). These few and nonconsistent findings suggest that in-group bias does not consistently differ due to
membership in differing organizations. Because no other consistent or significant
differences were found, this score was considered a naturally deviating score, and a
group difference variable was not included in the model.
Preliminary Fit of HLM Model: In-Group Bias
The examination of an unspecified HLM model with in-group bias as an outcome
variable indicated an intra-class correlation (ICC (r)) of .27 indicating that 27% of
variation for in-group bias resides between groups. Applying a formula for sufficient
between group variation (see Muthen, Muthen, Asparovhov, & Nguyen, 2006, but also
see Muthen & Satorra, 1995 for an applied example) provides a score o f 4.71(> 2.00),
indicating sufficient variation to use HLM in subsequent analyses. Reported deviance for
the unspecified model was 849.50. Subsequent significant reductions in this deviation
score when testing additional models represents a better fit.
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Preliminary Fit of Model: In-Group Bias. Inclusion of identity as a subject level
predictor produced a significant reduction in model deviation (849.50 versus 832.25, x2
(1,11)= 17.24,/? = .000). The inclusion of Level 2 predictors of inclusion and source
also tended to reduce model deviation (832.25 versus 823.20, x2 (4,8) = 9.04, p = .059).
Thus, in each step the addition of both Level 1 and Level 2 predictors o f negative
statements increased the overall fit o f the model. The inclusion o f an interaction term of
Inclusion X Source examining mean differences did not significantly reduce variation
(823.20 versus 822.97,

(1,12) = 0.22, p > .50), and the interaction term within this

model was not significant (p = .64). As such, the interaction term for this model was
removed from the analysis.
P rim a ry HLM Model: Identity. Inclusion, and Source as Predictors of In-Group

Bias
In order to examine our first three hypotheses, a 2 level HLM model was
employed with identity as a subject level predictor, and inclusion and source as Level 2
predictors. This HLM model will address whether or not (HI) in-group manipulations
produce less bias than out-group manipulations, (H2) low inclusion manipulations
produce less bias than high inclusion manipulations, and (H3) whether or not identity
differentially predicts bias as a function o f our manipulations.
Reliability for this model was .65, and approximately 44% of the between level
variation and

. % o f total model variation were explained with the addition of these

12 6

predictors to the model. Both HLM and OLS results are reported in Table 4.
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TABLE 4

HLM
Coefficient S.E.
/-ratio

Fixed Effect
LEVEL 2 Intercept po
ENTRCPT2, yOO
INCLUS, yOl
SOURCE, y02
LEVEL 1Identity pi
INTRCPT2, ylO
INCLUS, y ll
SOURCE, yl2

-2.83
-1.77
-0.36

0.58
0.69
0.69

-4.83
-2.55
-0.52

-0.99
0.06
0.58

0.27
0.30
0.30

-3.59

0 .0 0 1

0 .2 1

0.829
0.056

1.91

Final estimation of variance components:

Level-2,
L ev el- 1,

/7-value

S.D.

s2

0.97
2.29

0.94
5.24

X2

0 .0 0 1

0.031
0.610

OLS
Coefficient S.E.
/-ratio

/7-value

-3.41
-1.98
0.45

0.32
0.36
0.37

-10.54
-5.37
1 .2 2

0.000
0.000
0.224

-0.99
0.06
0.58

0.29
0.32
0.32

-3.35

0 .0 0 1

0 .2 0

0.841
0.075

1.78

in
/7-value

50.03 .001
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HLM and OLS Estimates ofIdentity, Inclusion, and Source Towards Predicting In-Group Bias

In terms o f main effects as represented by Po intercept scores, results indicate that
contrary to my hypothesis, the source of the message from an in-group or out-group
member did not significantly alter the amount of bias created (y = -.36, p = .61, HI).
However, the degree o f inclusion presented to groups did create significantly different
degrees o f bias (e.g., H2) indicating that groups who received a low inclusion threat
showed 1.77 units less bias compared to those who heard a high-inclusion threat (p .03).
In terms o f interaction effects between Level 1 identity and Level 2 variables,
results demonstrate that the degree of social identity that individuals express for a given
organization is generally associated with greater degrees o f bias (y = -.99, p = .001). In
addition, results indicate a trend (y = .58, p = .056) source X bias interaction where a
significantly greater identity/bias slope is associated with those groups who received a
message from an in-group member compared to an out-group member. Essentially, bias
remains consistently negative as identity increases for out-groups, but bias becomes
greater as identity increases for in-groups. However, in confirmation o f our expectation
that high identifiers would remain equivalently biased regardless of inclusion or source,
Figure 1 demonstrates that in-group and out-group high identifiers are equivalently and
highly biased, whereas low identifiers in both conditions differ in their bias ratings (H3).
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FIGURE 1. Figure o f the Interaction ofIdentity and Source Towards Predicting InGroup Bias.
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Results Section 2: HLM Models Examining Identity and Components of Persuasion
and Threat Evaluation
Preliminary Analyses of Persuasion Group Differences
Again, in order to examine potential group differences due to group type, a series
one-way ANOVAs were conducted within each manipulation type for Argument% and
Negative%. Tukey post-hoc tests were employed to determine any consistent differences
between individual groups within manipulations. For Argument% none of the ANOVAS
were significant. For Negative% only the high inclusion/in-group condition approached
significance (F(2,57) = 3.049,/? = .055). Examination of the individual group means
within this condition demonstrates that a religious group showed a significantly less
number of negative statements compared to an advocacy group (.26 versus .60,/? = .05)
but was not significantly different from the other group (p = .12). As none of these
isolated group differences show consistent differences across manipulations or dependent
variables, they were considered as natural variations from an overall distribution of the
dependent variable, and dummy codes were not included in subsequent models.
Preliminary Analyses: Identity and Central and Peripheral Processing
In order to examine any potential relationship between individual identity
invested within a particular organization and its relationship between the degree of
central and peripheral processing (H7), a Pearson correlation was performed to examine
the relationship between these two variables. Results indicate that identity is not
significantly associated with the degree o f argument centered statements presented (r = .10,/? = .16). However, any potential correlational relationship could be confounded by
differential association between identity and central processing due to the different
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conditions presented to participants across groups. A 2-Level HLM model was
employed to test this possibility.
Preliminary Fit of HLM Model: Argument Centered Statements. Examination of
an unspecified HLM model with argument centered statements as an outcome variable
indicates a very small amount of between group variation ICC (r) o f .002. The
application o f the Muthen et al., (2006) formula for sufficient between group variation
provides a score of 1.03, which indicates that insufficient variation is evident to use HLM
in subsequent analyses. As a result subject level analyses were employed to examine any
significant variation that could occur due to the manipulations with regards to the
relationship of identity and argument centered statements.
Identity. Inclusion, and Source as Predictors o f Argument Centered Statements.
An examination of subject level analyses where potential mean variation of argument
centered statements due to degree o f inclusion or source of the message did not show any
significant effects. More importantly, identity did not significantly predict argument
centered statements and interaction effects o f identity with the manipulations were not
significant. In summation, identity does not seem to be significantly related to central or
peripheral processing of the presented messages. These results can be examined in Table
5.
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TABLE 5

Fixed Effect

HLM
Coefficient S.E.
/-ratio

/?-value

OLS
/-ratio
Coefficient S.E.

LEVEL 2 Intercept (30
INTRCPT2, yOO
INCLUS, yOl
SOURCE, y02
LEVEL 1Identity pi
INTRCPT2, ylO
INCLUS, yll
SOURCE, yl2
Note: Level 1 and Level 2 variation cannot be computed for the OLS model.

0.59
-0 . 0 1
0.05
-0.03
0.04
0 .0 1

0 .0 2

0.04
0.04
0 .0 1

0.04
0.04

28.13
-0.31

/7-value

0 .0 0 0

1 .1 1

0.753
0.270

-1.38
0.98
0.26

0.169
0.328
0.793
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HLM and OLS Estimates ofIdentity, Inclusion, and Source Towards Predicting Degree ofArgument Centered Statements

message much more negatively than a participant engaging in central processing. In this
scenario, central elaboration on the argument itself may draw participants away from the
negative connotations denoted by the speaker in terms of tone and accusation. The
reasoning behind this expectation is that within the IRT context, part o f the motivation to
review a threat message is to invalidate it. Therefore, when a message is carefully
scrutinized, participants will have the opportunity to invalidate the argument, reducing
threat and consequence o f the message to the group, and in turn reducing overly hostile
reactions or statements.
This is in contrast to other persuasion research, where primarily central
processing will evoke more negative evaluations, particularly if the content of the
message is not strong (i.e. Petty et al. 1983). However, we expect IRT conditions to
make a difference in this particular series o f findings due to personal relevance and threat
o f the current situation. Although previous persuasion research purposely examined
issues that were not o f high personal relevance (e.g., Fabrigar & Petty, 1999), in the
current IRT scenario participants are motivated to examine the relevance o f the threat,
and if possible disarm it, which promotes the maintenance of well-being and self-esteem
of the participants (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Therefore, whether or not the message is
considered weak or strong, the primary motivation for participants first represent the
alleviation o f threat, and subsequently evaluate the nature of the message itself as a
strong or weak argument.
However, this is not to say that salience regarding the source o f the presentation
of the message, or the degree to which a threat message is applied to a group will not
influence central and peripheral arguments and participants’ responses to a threat
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message. Similar to in-group bias, the source o f a persuasive message as either an in
group or out-group could make a difference in how in-group members process and
evaluate that message. Persuasion literature that examines in-group/out-group sources of
a persuasive message is similar to previous research examining involvement as a factor
o f persuasion. In other words, personal relevance can be dictated by the group source of
a message. For instance, McGarty et al., (1994) demonstrated that group membership
plays a significant central route to persuasion. In this study, researchers manipulated ingroup/out-group status by asking for participant’s stance on one o f two messages
involving road safety or banning alcohol to prevent brain damage. Results showed that
agreement with messages were higher when they came from an in-group source,
regardless o f the amount of personal salience or relevance for the participant.
Additionally, McGarty et al., (1994) demonstrated that as salience increased for an in
group message, accurate recall of the speaker’s statements increased, whereas an out
group message demonstrated low message recall rates regardless o f salience. The
overall findings for this research suggest that messages from an out-group member are
not liked as well as messages from an in-group member, but more importantly, out-group
messages are not recalled as well, or at all, suggesting a lack o f scrupulous examination
(i.e., peripheral processing) of an out-group argument. Additional research has
supported the above findings that in-groups apply more scrutiny to in-group messages,
while generally resisting attitude change from out-groups (e.g. Flemming & Petty, 2000;
Wilder, 1990), whereas other research has consistently demonstrated differential
processing dependent on salience and the source o f the message as an in-group or out-
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group member (Mackie & Worth, 1989; Mackie Worth, & Asuncion, 1990; Mackie, et
al., 1992).
The body o f these findings suggests that peripheral processing is more likely
when out-groups present a threat message, which in turn could warrant more negative
evaluations of the message. In a similar vein, messages from in-group members should
be evaluated more on the merits o f the argument. Applied to our previous expectation
that peripheral processing is associated with greater degrees o f negative statements, we
would generally expect an interaction of central processing and source. Peripheral
processing should be more strongly associated with a threat message presented by an
out-group member generating a greater amount o f negative statements, compared to an
in-group member presenting a message, where we expect less peripheral processing, and
in turn, less negative statements.
Likewise, we propose that the inclusiveness of the threat itself might also alter
how a message is processed and evaluated. As a general principal both Petty and
Cacioppo (1986) with ELM as well as Turner et al., (1987) with SCT propose that it is
the personal relevance of the situation, or salience that dictates persuasion and positive
and negative responses. Regardless of whether or not the message is produced by an in
group or out-group member, the personal content o f the message is relevant to
participants to the extent that the threat is considered salient (Spears et al., 1997; Turner
et al., 1987). However, previous researchers examining persuasion and group identity
have not examined persuasion as a threat to in-group value. For instance, McGarty et al.,
(1994) chose road safety or alcohol abuse as persuasion topics, which did not contain
either positive or negative evaluations of group members. Rather, in-groups were created
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by pre-assessing attitudes about the presentation topic beforehand. Thus, the in-group’s
reaction to a persuasive message was manipulated based on the specific topic that was
evaluated. Neither the message presented nor the formation o f the in-groups in this
experiment addressed personal value of an in-group. Because previous research has not
directly addressed group value, we propose that threats to an in-group’s value represent a
consistently salient message that may result in different positive and negative responses
dependent upon to what degree the threat is applied to the group as a whole.
As with the source o f the message, we would expect a similar interaction of
central and peripheral processing and inclusion towards predicting positive and negative
responses. When a message is presented that applies to the entire group, we expect the
threat to invoke greater degrees o f personal relevance, and as such more central
processing is likely (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). As a consequence, we would expect less
overall degrees o f negative statements as the validity o f the threat message is specifically
considered, and cognitive opportunity is present to deconstruct the validity o f the threat.
When a message is presented to a group that only criticizes a few members, personal
relevance is less likely, and as such peripheral methods o f evaluation will be more likely.
As such we would expect a greater amount o f negative statements to be present as
peripheral processing increases.
To reiterate, as a result of these studies demonstrating the role o f personal
relevance in ELM, we would expect differences in how messages are evaluated
positively or negatively as a function o f the salience invoked by our manipulations, but
we would also expect participants’ degrees of central and peripheral processing to
individually contribute to positive and negative statements differentially due to our
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salience manipulations. In essence, positive and negative responses as a dependent
variable should vary as a function of the type of threat we present. Individual degrees of
central and peripheral processing in turn should help predict those positive or negative
responses dependent upon the condition presented.
Within-Groiip Identity and Persuasion
Although the above hypotheses address the potential relationships between
central and peripheral processing, salience, and positive and negative assessments of a
threat message, they do not address the role o f individual identity. Research would
suggest that greater degrees of investment within the membership of a group would
lessen the degree to which argument focused elaborations would occur. Individuals who
maintain high levels of identity are not likely to examine or change their attitudes
regarding out-group members’ messages. As explained by Branscombe et al., (1999) and
Spears et al., (1999), high identifiers are more prone to exhibit in-group bias, and low
identifiers are only prone to in-group bias if it furthers group goals or status
improvement. As such, those who highly identify with a group are more likely to engage
in peripheral processing, as the invested identity within the group would make highly
identified participants to be less likely to carefully evaluate a message from an out-group
member, or distinguish a threat towards a few members versus the entire group. The
subsequent expectation from this research is that in general, identity will not only be
positively associated to negative statements within a threat scenario, but also be
positively related with peripheral processing.
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Identity and Focus on the In-Group
To examine our final two questions, we first have to address the relationship
between the processing o f a counter-attitudinal threat message and the potential attitude
change that can occur from that processing. Because previous research has not addressed
persuasion as a threat to group value, how attitude change is assessed within persuasion
literature must also be examined in the context o f threat to group value. However, when
persuasion and attitude change are examined in the context of group dynamics and threat,
another simple component o f group interchange likely affects how participants process a
threat message. Salience between an in-group and an out-group represents a focus on
the differences between the two groups (Turner et al., 1987). Following these basic
premises, salience between these two groups represents a contrast that creates bias
because the out-group is perceived as different from the in-group. In order for bias to be
attributed to the out-group, participants must focus their cognitive elaborations towards
the out-group and not the in-group. In other words, it seems likely that elaboration o f the
threat message will involve a focus upon the negative qualities of the out-group and not
the validity of the message towards reducing positive views o f the in-group.
Thus, the focus of a participant’s cognitive elaborations on either the in-group or
out-group might produce different degrees o f attitude change, regardless o f the amount of
central or peripheral processing. We propose that the greater the salience o f contrast
between two groups, the greater the in-group’s s elaboration willfocus on the out-group.
Conversely, less salient contrast between two groups suggests in-group elaboration will
focus on defending the in-group. Because conditions o f threat maximize salience, they
induce a separation between an in-group and an out-group. The cognitive elaboration
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necessary to defend the in-group’s value results in a focus of the validity of the out
group’s position and arguments. Conversely, if salience between groups is less, then the
validity of an argument is not addressed purely on the basis of it coming from an out
group. As a result, individuals may attempt to address threat by examining conditions
within their own group. We would expect that the overall ratings attributed to a threat
message would differ based in part as a function o f predominantly in-group or out-group
focused elaborations. To the extent that participants see less of a contrast between the
presenter o f a threat message and themselves, or to the extent that the message is
considered personally relevant, it is more likely that the individual will apply the
statements to his or her own group and elaborate upon them. Thus, less overall salience
may result in greater amounts o f group-focused statements in contrast to high salience
conditions where the participant is defending the well being o f the group from the
outsider.
Similarly, salience is also determined by the degree to which participants identify
with a particular group (Branscombe et al., 1999; Spears et al., 1999). Because high
identifiers are expected to treat threat as relevant (e.g., Doosje et al., 2002), regardless of
the source of the message, it seems likely that high identifiers will be more likely to
automatically focus on the out-group. Consider that an individual who is highly invested
in a particular organization and deriving purpose and meaning from that group, would be
unlikely to examine potential flaws and shortcomings within a particular group. As such,
we would expect greater degrees o f identity to be associated with greater amounts o f out
group focused elaborations in order to minimize the degree to which participants are
willing to review a threat message about their own group.
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As a function o f potential differences in in-group focused elaborations due to the
amount o f salient contrast evoked, it also seems likely that in-group focused elaborations
are directly or indirectly associated with the amount o f participants’ positive and negative
responses. Consider that greater salient threat conditions will minimize the motivation to
review a naive theory by promoting cognitive elaboration towards the out group and not
the in group. Likewise, because low inclusion threats are expected to evoke less salience
compared to high-inclusion threats we would expect greater amounts o f in-group focused
elaborations. As such, it seems likely that when salience is high, out-group elaboration is
more likely, resulting in negative statements. Borrowing from the research o f Mackie et
al., (1990) and McGarty et al., (1994), our manipulations of source and inclusion,
partially due to variation in-group focused elaboration, will invoke differing degrees of
positive and negative statements. Specifically, out-group elaborations should be more
significantly associated with negative responses in out-group messages compared to in
group messages and high inclusion manipulations compared to low inclusion
manipulations.
In summation, the above discussion o f persuasion proposes two broad influences
towards the evaluation of IRT threat messages. First, we expect individual effects of
identity, central and peripheral processing, and elaboration focus to significantly
contribute to positive or negative evaluations o f threat messages. Subsequently, we
propose that the conditions o f inclusion and source o f the message will potentially alter
these relationships, due to differing degrees o f salient contrast that they evoke.
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The Removal of Salient Identity Threat and the Perseverance of Belief
The previous section examining attitude change represents a global test of belief
perseverance applied to identity, only in reverse. More specifically, attitude change
about a group’s value when an individual has previous investment in a group is the
opposite of belief perseverance. In the previous section we propose that attitude change
was a function o f the focus of elaborations about a threat. Because salience represents a
focus between in-group/out-group comparison, we expect that the degree of salience
elicited by a threat may invoke a different focus on elaborations. Highly salient
situations will result in a positive increase in perceived group value due to a focus of
elaborating about the out-group, and not the defense of the in-group’s merits.
Conversely, lower degrees of salience will illicit an evaluation o f the validity of the
argument that might in turn lower a participant’s perception of group value.
Our final section removes itself from the specific predictions of bias and
persuasion and asks a more general question: once conditions that promote inter-group
comparison and conflict are invalidated, will previous attitudes about in-group value and
bias towards the out-group persevere? It is important to note that the current question is
independent o f other hypotheses presented in the current study. Although the
manipulations o f investment, source, and identity are potentially interesting exploratory
questions, attitude change as a result o f threat can be examined in terms o f whether or not
it persists after the initial information has been recanted. Thus, in contrast to the creation
of a single naive belief in the laboratory, our question about belief perseverance is
whether a complex threat situation and resultant attitudes that occur can be nullified by
recanting the information that initially started the conflict.
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Early research in belief perseverance demonstrated a tendency for people to
persevere in beliefs that were created within the laboratory. For instance, Ross, Lepper,
and Hubbard (1975) demonstrated that individuals persisted in their belief about their
ability to judge actual suicide notes from fake ones, even after being informed that their
initial assessment o f their ability was random and inaccurate. Likewise, Anderson,
Lepper, & Ross (1980) demonstrated that a created association between risk-taking and
success as a fire-fighter persisted after disconfirming information. Subsequent studies
have applied belief perseverance to more realistic settings and demonstrated similar
findings. For instance, Jennings, Lepper, and Ross (1981) showed that perceived success
or failure in persuading a confederate to donate blood persisted even after discredited.
These studies demonstrate a tendency to persevere with specific beliefs and more
complex value related beliefs such as persuasive ability (e.g., Jennings et al., 1981);
however, their applicability towards broader belief systems that represent personal
investment over time has been mostly assumed rather than tested (i.e., Anderson, 1995b).
Applied to a threat situation defined within an SIT or SCT identity context, we propose a
tentative explanation for how attitudes resulting from in-group/out-group threat might
persevere. Our interpretation is dependent upon crucial and often repeated assumptions
o f SCT in the current manuscript. In-group bias is a function of salience that is
established within a situational basis (Turner et al., 1987). As salience represents the
mechanism that establishes attitudes towards the out-group, invalidating the situation and
the message might result in a new situation where group identity is no longer salient, and
thus, previous attitudes and judgments no longer apply. Thus, the question posed is
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whether or not differing degrees of threat “salience” as represented by our inclusion and
source variables will mediate the degree of bias or value maintained.
Belief perseverance research shows that belief perseverance can be negated,
depending on several factors. For instance, Anderson (1983) showed that perseverance
can be mediated by individuals creating causal scenarios of why their current belief is
correct. Likewise, if a debriefing explains the tendency for belief perseverance,
laboratory created beliefs can be negated (Ross et al., 1975). These findings suggest that
participants must either elaborate on the new information or be made aware of a tendency
to persist in beliefs in order to revise previous information (see also Anderson & Sechler,
1986). In addition, the nature o f the belief being examined also affects belief
perseverance. The perceived value o f an in-group is a pre-existing belief that contributes
to one’s self-worth. Logically, previously held beliefs that are personally relevant are
maintained more tenaciously than beliefs that are not as personally relevant. Research by
Anderson (1995a) showed that previously held implicit personality theories biased
subsequent judgments on non-congruent trait pairs (e.g., politeness related to lying). This
finding is in some ways replicated with invested groups by Batson (1975) who not only
demonstrated persistence o f religious beliefs in the face of discontinuing information, but
also showed a subsequent increase in these beliefs.
The result o f these findings suggests that within the current context o f threat,
negative attitudes about the out-group will persist even after the validity o f the threat is
demonstrated to be fictitious. However, we propose a tentative caveat involving belief
perseverance that may be relevant within identity threat conditions. Following research
by Batson (1975), who found that in some cases discrediting beliefs would actually
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intensify the beliefs being discredited, we would expect increased beliefs about in-group
value as well as negative perceptions o f the out-group to persist despite discrediting
information about the threat. As with our discussion of attitude change, we expect this is
a function of elaboration based on the out-group due to salient contrast. Although it
would be considered beneficial for participants to maintain their beliefs about the
superiority o f their in-group, it would not be beneficial for participants to ignore the
nullification of threat if their perception o f the value of the in-group has lessened. For
those participants who have perceived the threat as valid and have subsequently reduced
their perceptions o f the value o f the in-group, nullification of the threat would be
considered excellent motivation to change their negative assessment of their own group.
Thus, based on Anderson and Lindsay's (1998) components o f time, resources, and
motivation that are necessary to review a naive theory, we might expect any negative
change in the perceived value o f a group to revert to pre-threat levels once the threat has
been negated
Summation, of Premises. Exploratory Hypotheses and Predictive Hypotheses
The current study seeks to apply social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979)
and self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) to immediate and relevant threat
(IRT) scenarios. An examination of three variables that determine salience are used to
examine specific outcomes of conflict. These independent variables are identity, the
source o f a message as either an in-group or out-group, and the inclusion o f the message
as either applying to a few or all of a target groups’ members. We apply these
manipulations to three principal variables of conflict, namely, in-group bias, persuasion,
and the persistence o f in-group bias and value. In addition, we explore the possibility
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that pre-existing group membership of specific ideologies may differentially contribute to
our dependent variables o f interest. A summary list of expectations is provided below.
In-Group Bias:
HI. In-group manipulations will produce less bias than out-group
manipulations.
H2. Low inclusion manipulations will produce less bias than high inclusion
manipulations.
H3. An interaction o f identity and manipulation conditions will occur where
individuals who have low identity will show differentiation between
manipulation conditions, but high-identifiers will remain consistently and
highly biased regardless o f manipulations.
Persuasion:
Central and Peripheral Processing:
H4. Central processing will be inversely related to participants ’ negative
statements in IRT conditions.
H5. Out-group manipulations will produce more negative statements than in
group manipulations.
H6. Low inclusion manipulations will produce greater amounts o f negative
statements compared to high-inclusion statements.
H7. Identity will be positively associated with both the amount o f negative
statements participants produce and positively associated with peripheral
processing.
Group Focused Statements:
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H8. In-group focused elaborations will be inversely associated with negative
statements.
H9. Low inclusion and in-group manipulations will contain greater amounts o f
in-group focused elaborations compared to higher salience invoking
manipulations o f high inclusion or out-group manipulations.
H10. Identity will be inversely associated with in-group focused elaboration.
H U . Group-focused statements will predict greater amounts o f negative
statements in high inclusion, out-group manipulations, and less amounts o f
negative statements in low inclusion in-group manipulations.
Persistence of Bias and Belief:
H I 2. Bias will persist after the validity o f the threat is demonstrated to be
fictitious.
H I 3. A negative change in the perceived value o f a group will not persist after
the validity o f the threat is demonstrated to be fictitious.
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CHAPTER II

METHOD

Overview
In order to accurately examine the role of conflict and in-group bias with pre
existing groups, several potential confounds and considerations need to be taken into
account. The general design of this study employed a 2 (in-group source, out-group
source) X 2 (low threat inclusion, high threat inclusion) design, with ratings of identity
and other variables as predictors of the dependent variable. However, in order to both
control for and examine differences between individuals within groups and overall group
effects, hierarchical linear modeling (HLM; Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992) was employed as
the dominant means of analysis. A more detailed description of the HLM process is
described in the Results section.
Participants
Student organizations were recruited from four college campuses, including
three public universities in the Midwest, and one Northeastern mid-sized university,
representing a total o f 12 groups. O f these 12 groups, 4 general group types were
assessed including fraternities, sororities, Christian religious groups, and political or
ideological cause groups. Participant sizes for these groups ranged from 5 to 49 (M= 15;
SD = 12.86). Each o f the four groups within one particular group type received one of
the two by two manipulations of source (in-group, out-group) and inclusion (low, high).
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Procedure
Several procedural steps were used to recruit student organizations. Across four
universities a list o f student organizations were selected based on their mission
statements. Groups that espoused a specific cause, regardless o f the particulars of that
cause, were selected for contact. Student leaders o f these organizations were contacted to
discuss the full purpose and nature of the study and their group’s potential participation,
emphasizing the temporary deception necessary to effectively conduct the study. Student
leaders who agreed to participate served as confederates by announcing that someone
was coming to speak with their organization with a representative from the university.
Additionally, we insisted that the group leader not provide any additional information
about the meeting, feigning ignorance if necessary, about why a person was coming to
speak with them.
All experimental sessions were conducted at the regular meeting place and
meeting time o f a particular organization. At the appointed time, the student leader
announced the principal investigator’s name and informed the organization that he and
another person were going to speak with them. For all sessions, the principal investigator
was accompanied by a confederate who served as a “representative” from another student
organization, and one or two research assistants. The principal investigator informed the
organization that he was a representative from the university examining an “experimental
new communication technique” by bringing a representative from another student
organization to speak with them. The principal investigator then began a two- stage
consent process in order to ensure voluntary participation on the part of participants. In
the first stage the PI explained that this communication technique involved the use of
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surveys, participation was voluntary, and participants were to carefully read the consent
forms distributed, and should they agree, sign the form. Participants were also informed
during this first stage that they would all be given a second opportunity to choose to
participate after a full explanation o f the procedure was given. In stage two, participants
were informed that the PI was examining a new communication technique that allowed
groups to freely express their thoughts and feelings when they had complaints about
another student organization. The PI then explained that the actor confederate
represented a student organization that for purposes o f the procedure will remain
anonymous so that they could express themselves without fear of their affiliation
influencing the participant’s organization. Participants were told that surveys would be
used so that participants within the target organization could express their feelings
without fear of peer influence. They were then given the opportunity to withdraw their
participation and leave the room.
Participants were then instructed to complete a packet of pre-assessment
measures (See Appendix C) and informed that the anonymous group representative will
present his or her concerns after these packets are completed (See Appendix B).
Manipulation 1
During the process of explaining the procedure, our “representative speaker” was
introduced as either representing members o f another student organization that has very
different ideas and goals as the target group (out-group) or a student organization that
shares similar goals and ideals (in-group). This explanation served as the principal
manipulation with regards to out-group or in-group source.
Independent and Covariate Measures
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Several initial measures and one-item questions were provided for participants to
complete before, during, and after the “representative” presented his or her message.
These measures either served as subject level predictors of group manipulations, or as
covariates. For each measure, an indication of its use is explained for particular models
in subsequent analyses.
Identity: (Luhtanen & Crocker. 1992). The measure used for identity represents a
sub-scale o f the Collective Self Esteem (CSE) scale. The CSE is a 16-item measure
designed to assess several components of self esteem derived from group identity. Of
primary interest to the current study is the four-item sub-scale that measures the degree of
self concept gained from group membership (e.g., “The social groups I belong to are an
important reflection o f who I am.”). Each item contains likert style responses anchored
at 1 {strongly disagree) and 7 {strongly agree). Subscale scores were calculated by
taking the average o f each subscale after reversals. A high score on the identity subscale
indicates a greater degree o f identity derived from a group. Reliability (a) for this sub
scale was .71
Individual Group Affiliation. In order to control for and possibly account for
differences in the dependent variables due to differing group ideologies or types, a series
o f within-manipulation t-tests were conducted (e.g., do religious groups consistently
differ from sororities in all four conditions?). If differences between group scores were
consistent across manipulation types and if differences were fully crossed across the
model, a dummy code (0,1) was placed in the group level analysis. Please note that these
codes were test driven in that codes were created due to significant differences, rather
than the group type itself. Thus, it can be the case where groups assigned to a specific
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code may represent all four group types because these groups specifically differ from
other groups across the manipulations. Full details involving this process are described in
the Results section.
Perception of Value Change. Perceived value o f belonging to a group was
assessed by asking one question anchored at 1 {not at all) and 13 {completely) in the pre,
middle, and post sections of the assessment. The question asks, “To what extent do other
members of this group behave in such a way that promotes the “positive image” o f your
group?” This repeated question assessed the degree that participants believe that they are
associating with a group that is altruistic or positive. Difference measures were created
by subtracting each participant’s response after the manipulation statement from the
participant’s pre-manipulation response. Thus, a negative score represents a participant’s
reduction in perceived value o f the group, whereas a positive score represents an increase
in the perception o f value in the group. This process is repeated by subtracting the post
assessment o f this item from the manipulation assessment of value, creating a post value
change score to examine after the participants had been informed of the untrue nature of
the “representative’s” statement. Again, negative scores represent further reduction in
perceived value, whereas positive scores represent an increase in perceived group value.
Manipulation 2
After completion o f pre-assessment measures, participants were informed that the
“representative speaker” will now present his or her statement and that following the
speaker’s statement, participants should complete section B of the survey packet (See
Appendix C). Participants were told that these packets give them the opportunity to
respond to our “anonymous group’s concerns”. Our confederate then recited one of four
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carefully composed scripts that differ in the degree of threat inclusion and provided
secondary reinforcement of the source (i.e., in-group or out-group member) of the
representative speaker (See Appendix B for all four statements).
Composition o f these scripts was assessed by several senior psychology students,
some of whom were members of student organizations of interest. After several
alterations, this focus group concluded that the statements represent a realistic and hostile
criticism o f another organization, but was general enough to apply to groups with
different ideologies. To ensure that the presentation o f the messages was as consistent as
possible, confederates represented undergraduate students with previous acting
experience who spent several hours rehearsing the manipulation scripts. Every attempt
was made to ensure that confederates presented the script and its contents with a similar
degree o f upset, vocal tone, and non-verbal behavior.
The content of these scripts were identical with the exception o f the extent to
which they accused the entire group o f inappropriate behaviors, close-mindedness, and
elitism (high-inclusion), or only accused a few members o f the group o f these traits (low
inclusion). Furthermore, during sessions where the confederate represented a group that
was similar to die participant’s organization, participants recited one initial sentence:
“First o f all, I would like to say that I am (a) xxxx like the rest of you.” For example,
when presenting the message to a fraternity, the confederate would state that he is a
member of a fraternity like the rest o f the participants. These statements served as a
reminder to participants that the representative belonged to a similar group and represents
the secondary reinforcement o f source in our manipulation procedure.
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However, it should be noted that the gender o f our confederate speaker was not
random due to the nature o f the groups being assessed. For instance, it was not viable to
present a female confederate as an in-group speaker to a fraternity or a male as an in
group speaker to a sorority. Although this presents a potential confound of gender with
source of the message, this confound is addressed in several ways. Most importantly,
gender should not theoretically override group membership salience in this type of
experiment. Turner et al. (1987) suggests that more inclusive groups override broader
contrast groups such as age or gender. Indeed, differences in bias due to gender in some
ways represent a subordinate part o f a particular group’s overall ideology towards other
groups. However, certain precautions and preliminary analyses were employed to
examine any potential effect that gender had towards contributing to results. These
precautions are described in subsequent sections.
After completion of the statement by the confederate, participants were instructed
to hold their questions or concerns and complete section B where there is an opportunity
to write their responses to the statement after completing the required measures described
below.
In-group bias: Jackson and Smith (19991 and Luhtanen and Crocker (19921.
Semantic differential scales were employed in the pre-manipulation, manipulation, and
post-manipulation phases o f the experiment. Several polar adjectives (inferior/superior,
uncreative/creative, unhelpful/helpful, unfriendly/friendly, uncooperative/cooperative,
ignorant/knowledgeable, close-minded/open-minded, unjust/just, incorrect views/correct
views) were rated on 13 point scales anchored at +6 (positive adjective) to -6 (negative
adjective). In the pre-manipulation phase, participants rated their own group, and the
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confederate actor who presented the manipulation message. During the manipulation
phase, individuals again rated the speaker on these adjectives. Finally, these scales were
completed again after being informed that the message was fictitious. Reliability (a) for
these semantic differential items was greater than .90 for all scales.
Two scores o f bias were obtained in the present study representing a change in
bias after the manipulation, as well as the degree o f bias that remained after participants
were informed that the statement provided to them was untrue. Manipulation-bias was
created by subtracting participants’ ratings o f their own group from ratings of the speaker
after he or she had presented the message. Summed positive scores from these adjectives
indicate that the spokesperson is viewed as having greater degrees o f positive qualities
when compared to the participant’s group. Negative scores from these adjectives
indicate that the spokesperson has less positive qualities compared to the participant’s
group, indicating in-group bias.
Residual-bias was determined by subtracting our final measurement o f bias from
manipulation bias. This score represents a shift in bias from the manipulation stage to the
post stage of the experiment. This variable was used to examine bias persistence after the
nature o f the statement as false had been disclosed. Summed positive scores from these
adjectives indicate that the spokesperson is viewed as having greater degrees of positive
qualities when compared to the participant’s group. Again, negative scores from these
adjectives indicate that the spokesperson has less positive qualities compared to the
participant’s group, indicating in-group bias.
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Content Coding Involving the Examination of Central and Peripheral Processing.
Positive and Negative Statements, and In-group and Out-group Elaboration Focus of
Threat Messages. In order to examine how participants responded to threat messages,
they were given the following instructions: “Please list any and all comments or thoughts
that you had while listening to the speaker’s statements. Please feel free to include any
comments about anything related to what the speaker said in the speech, the speaker and
the speaker’s personality, the topic of the speech, the context in which the speaker spoke,
or anything else you might have been thinking about during message presentation,
including totally unrelated things” (Mackie et al., 1990, p. 814). Using a coding scheme
provided by the same authors, statements were coded in different ways. First, raters
assessed the number of sentence statements made on the argument presented by the
speaker (A) or personal characteristics of the speaker (S) as an example o f predominantly
peripheral or central processing. In order to assess the focus o f elaborative statements,
statements were analyzed as to whether they refer to the in-group (I) or out-group (O). In
this manner the responses o f participants were examined in terms o f whether the defense
of the in-group represents a focus on the group to which the participant belongs or a
focus on the speaker presenting the message. Third, in order to examine the positive or
negative content o f the response message, sentences were coded as either positive (+),
negative (-), or neutral (N).
Measures o f these three ratings were created by summing the number of
argument focused statements, in-group focused statements, and negative statements and
then dividing each participant’s score by the total number of statements made. Thus,
three variables, Argument%, Group% and Negative% represent the respective percentage
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o f these components in a participant’s response. Greater percentages of any of these
variables represent an overall greater percentage of that component within the overall
response. Note that in the case o f Argument% and Group%, the remaining percentage not
accounted for by these variables represents respectively, peripheral statements% and
statements focused on the speaker or the speaker’s anonymous group.
Post Assessment and Debriefing
Upon completion of the manipulation packet, participants were informed that
this procedure was fictitious and that our speaker did not represent any actual student
group. Before explaining the full purpose o f the experiment, participants were given a
short closing packet that contained all of the dependent measures with the exception of
the open-ended responses, in order to rate their perceptions of the individual after they
were informed that the information presented was not accurate and fictitious (See
Appendix C for specific scales). Upon completion of this packet, participants were
informed of the actual purpose o f the study (See Appendix B for procedural script). An
extended discussion followed where the principal investigators address any potential
negative feelings that had arisen as well as the usefulness of the experiment for
individuals and the group to which they belonged. Discussion topics included previous
findings in persuasion and conflict and how the experimental experience, as well as these
findings, could serve as useful tools in potential future conflicts. The experimental
session did not end until participants indicated that they were aware of the true aims of
the experiment and demonstrated positive affect in their behaviors (e.g., smiles,
laughing). Finally, participants were asked not to disclose the nature o f the experiment to
others for the remaining period of assessment. Subsequent contact with group leaders,
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approximately two to three weeks after assessment, did not indicate any specific
incidents of resentment, anger, or emotional perturbation from themselves or their group
members.
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CHAPTER III

RESULTS

Overview and Hierarchical Linear Model Design
HLM is a method of analysis that examines nested data in tiers, or levels (Nezlek
& Zyzniewski, 1998). In general, HLM analyzes data based on two (or more) levels
where each subsequent level depends on the outcome of the previous level with regards
to its particular effect. HLM has been used in the social sciences to examine student and
classroom behavior, (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992), dyadic pair behavior (Cronin, 1994;
Nezlek, 2001) and is well known for its use in longitudinal studies (O’Connor, 2004).
Unlike ordinary least squares estimates o f data (e.g., ANOVA), HLM employs an
iterative method based on maximum likelihood estimates (MLE; Bryk & Raudenbush,
1992), which in essence, fits probability distributions to data. Thus, similar to other
iterative techniques such as structural equation modeling, HLM presents models of
results that are designed to fit the data.
There are several benefits to using HLM, particularly within the current analysis.
First, unlike OLS techniques, HLM relaxes the independence assumption between
subjects. Whenever data is collected within any sort of group, or is not collected
individually, certain environmental constants, such as temperature, group membership, or
general atmosphere may create an interdependent effect within a particular group. As a
result, most authors recommend the use o f group level as the focus for these types of
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analyses (see Silverman & Solmon, 1998). Second, group level analysis alone does not
address the variability and individual level response of the participants. Likewise, it does
not provide for unique contributions to the data due to individual response. This
distinction between subject and group effects is particularly relevant to social identity.
Social identity is conceived as a subject level variable that is affected by the norms of
one’s group (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al.,
1987). HLM accounts for both subject and group levels o f analysis by making group
level analysis dependent upon subjects within the group. Each group represents an
individual regression slope that is created by the subjects within the group. Each of these
slopes is then weighted with regards to its reliability, which is a function of the group’s
sample size as well as how much subject level data is responsible for genuine variance of
the outcome variable. In addition, HLM provides estimates of variability for both subject
and group levels of analysis, thus allowing for an accurate examination of where the
majority of variation occurs.
When using HLM to specify a model based on observations, several issues of fit
and design should be addressed. In regards to the latter, the current study employed a
two-level model where individual subjects within groups were represented at Level 1 and
group outcomes due to the 2 X 2 manipulation o f source and inclusion were represented
at Level 2. This general 2-Level model was employed for each relevant dependent
variable o f interest. However, models must further be specified due to a variety of
theoretical possibilities that best fit the data. In this particular case, although Level 2
variables are non-random manipulations o f the group in question, predictor variables at
Level 1 are specified as random. As such, a series of tests are traditionally performed to
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determine (a) the amount of unpredicted group and subject level variation within the
dependent variable, (b) the amount o f variation accounted for by subject level predictors
alone, and (c) the amount of variation accounted for by subject and group level variables.
The issue of fit in this case is tested by a series o f models in which Level 1
variables are set as random, examined, and the models are compared in terms o f a
significant increase or decrease of overall fit. Thus, for each outcome dependent
variable, methodology used from Bryk and Raudenbush (1992) was employed that
represents a series o f three models that determine the best fit for the variability o f the
data. As variability may be constant for one outcome variable and a particular predictor,
but not another variable, these models were employed for each dependent variable of
interest. Essentially, three models, the Unspecified Model, Slopes as Outcomes Model,
and Means and Slopes as Outcomes models were examined for each principal analysis.
The Unspecified Model is the equivalent of a one-way ANOVA with random
effects where Level 1 is denoted as:

1 .1

[ Yij= Poy + r ij ]

The outcome of any particular participant’s Y,7 is a function o f poj (the intercept
or mean outcome o f / groups) and r,-y, which is the error term representing an unique
effect of the individual subject. The Level 2 model is denoted as:

1-2

[ Poy = Yo o + go7 ]
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For this equation, Poyis calculated by the effect of yo o representing the grand
mean between groups, and goy is the random effect between these groups. An
examination of a model specified in this manner does not test specific predictors or
hypotheses. Rather, it provides an estimation o f within and between variation,
demonstrating where the majority of variation occurs. As an example, use of these
equations for the outcome variable of in-group bias would demonstrate the amount of
bias variability that resides at the subject level, as well as the amount of bias variation
that resides between groups.
The Slopes as Outcomes Model represents a general model where individual
predictors are placed within the Level 1 model, but manipulations as represented by
inclusion and source are excluded. This model provides a general relationship between
the Level 1 predictors and the Level 2 outcome or dependent variable. For this model,
the Level 2 model is the same as before:

2.1

[Po/ = yoo + Mo./]

The Level 1 model, however, is altered to include one or more Level 1 predictors.

2.2

t f 7= p 0; + p i,(X l7- X .;) + r /y]

In this equation, Poy remains as the intercept, and Piy (X,7 - X .J) represents the
inclusion of a predictor term that is multiplied by the difference of individual scores
within a group minus the group mean. In essence, this model allows for the Level 1
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prediction of Level 2 outcome variables without the context of Level 2 group
manipulations. Note that multiple predictors can be placed in this model with the
addition of P.;y prediction variables. Using our previous example, piy would represent
individual participants’ identity scores towards the prediction of in-group bias without
the effect o f either inclusion or source manipulations at Level 2.
Finally, the Means and Slopes as Outcomes model examines both the intercepts
o f the model as well as the slopes for each group. Level 1 data is represented in the same
way as equation 2.2:

3-1

[^ 7 =Poy + Piy(X,7 - X . y )

+ r 7]

However, including Level 2 predictors creates two separate equations for each Pij
predictor representing the individual contributions of slopes within groups, as well as
mean variation. Thus for the Level 1 example, two Level 2 equations are presented:

3.2

[Poj = Yoo + Yo i W/ +poj\

3.3

[Pij

= Yi o + Yi l W / + p i y]

In equation 3.2 the intercept, Poy, is a function of yo o, which represents the grand
mean for any outcome variable and yo i , which represents the difference in means of W y,
a nominal indicator variable. The last term, poy represents the unique effect o f a particular
group while holding Wy constant. In equation 3.3 the predictor variable, Piy, is the
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function o f y i o, which represents the average slope o f the predictor variable and y i i ,
which is the mean difference o f slopes between the indicator variable W F inally,
represents the unique effect of a particular group on the slope of the predictor variable
while holding W y constant.
In equations 3.2 and 3.3 above, only one indicator variable is placed at Level 2.
However, in the majority of analyses that follow, two Level 2 indicators are placed
representing the effects of inclusion and source. Substituting these titles for the W /s, a
general model for subsequent HLM analyses is constructed in equations 4.1,4.2, and 4.3.

4.1

[(D. V ) = p0j + Piy (Predictor Variable) + r ,y ]

4.2

[poy = yo o + Yo l (Inclusion) + y02 (Source) +poy]

4.3

[Piy = yi 0 + Yi 1 (Inclusion) + yi 2 (Source)+piy]

The selection of the model that best fits the data involves comparison of the
deviance statistic between models. The significant increase or decrease in fit is
determined by a x2 distribution. These comparison models will be compared to the
overall hypothesized models to determine overall fit. In order to save space, only the
distribution of variance presented in percentages will be stated for the Unspecified Model
in order to give readers basic information about where variance is distributed in the
model. Similarly, only deviance statistics, as well as inclusion or removal from a model
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will be reported, whereas the best fitting model will be defined in detail within each
section.
Finally, some measures will consistently serve as variables across all of the
analyses. At Level 1, the personal identity sub-scale of the CSE will serve as a predictor
of Level 2 variables representing identity invested in the group. In addition, dummy
codes representing an individual’s group affiliation will be placed (if applicable) in order
to detect and control for any individual effects due to group affiliation. As with most
model programs, effect codes that do not show significant differences will be removed
from the model to conserve Level 1 degrees o f freedom. At Level 2, inclusion of the
threat and source of the threat as an in-group or out-group member represent our
manipulations, but each model is tested for the viability o f an Inclusion X Source
interaction term to be placed within the Level 2 model. In cases where fit is significantly
improved and the interaction term is significant, this term is placed in the Level 2 model.
In cases where these conditions are not met, the term is excluded.
Mean Differences and General Slope Prediction; Effects of Group Mean Centering
Note that the majority o f predictive Level 1 (or subject) variables are group mean
centered. This centering method subtracts the mean of an individual subject within a
group from die group mean (e.g. [scorey - groupscore.j]) for each group. The result of
this centering method results in the intercept representing the mean o f each group in a
regression equation. These means are then effectively ignored creating an overall metric
where 0 represents the average score within all groups, and positive and negative scores
represent deviations o f the predictor from that average (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992).
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Practical interpretation of a variable that has been group mean centered provides
an “average” slope, demonstrating the relationship o f the predictor to the dependent
variable regardless of where the mean score for a particular group might reside. Thus, Y
in the regression equation becomes a general variable where for any mean value of Y, the
regression equation provides a general prediction o f how the predictor variable in
question is associated with Y. This method of interpretation is useful for this type of
analysis where pre-existing groups may exhibit differing mean degrees of a particular
predictor variable due to pre-existing conflicts or inherent politics inherent to the target
group. Thus, results and figures provided for predictor variables represent the average
slope of a predictor variable regardless o f its mean differences.
Mean differences are represented by yo. analyses, demonstrating how between
variation of the dependent variable due to the manipulations created differences in the
variable in question. An examination of these two analyses involving mean differences
and average slopes of predictors demonstrate mean variation due to the manipulations,
and how, on average, the predictor variables behave towards explaining the mean
differences across groups.
Environmental. Contextual, and Manipulation Checks
Although HLM is designed to account for within group commonalities due to
environment, it does not specifically address what these sources represent. Because the
nature o f this study involves an environmental examination of pre-existing groups that is
not conducted within a laboratory, potential confounds are examined due to the design of
the study as well as the overall perceptions o f participants of their group and the threat
scenario. This is important for three reasons. First, because o f the nature of the design,
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some components such as gender o f the confederate could not be held constant. To that
extent, it is worthwhile to examine if any differences did exist that are subsequently
controlled for by using HLM. Second, relevant data that defines how participants
perceived their group within the experimental experience helps to define an
environmental context by which these results can be compared to relevant “real-life”
group conflict scenarios. Similarly, it also helps to define what type o f group (e.g., a
positively viewed group versus a less esteemed group) to which these findings are most
likely to apply. Third, because studies have not undertaken social identity research of
this nature, data regarding participants’ perceptions helps to further place and connect the
current findings with a well-established previous body o f literature.
Overall Believabilitv
Belief was assessed by two principal sources. First participants who responded
negatively to “Before we told you that the representative presented fictitious information,
did you believe that his/her statement came from another student organization?” were
removed from the sample. Second, any participant whose written response indicated that
the participant questioned the nature of the speaker as coming from an “anonymous
student organization” was also removed from analysis. Overall 237 participants
participated across 12 groups; however, 16 were removed because they were group
leaders who were previously informed o f the study. O f the remaining 221 subjects, 180
represented subjects who “believed”, demonstrating an 81% overall belief rate across
groups. Thus, all analyses regarding hypotheses, manipulation checks, or descriptive
data, represent participants who believed in the experimental scenario.
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Potential Differences in Bias and Persuasion due to Actor Gender
Some categories o f groups necessitated a particular gender to perform as either
an in-group or out-group member. For instance, a male confederate speaker could not
perceived as an in-group member of a sorority. In order to examine potential differences
due to the gender of the confederate actor, several t-tests were conducted with the initial
rating of the speaker. These ratings were analyzed because they are only influenced by
the first manipulation of the source o f the message by presenting the speaker as a
representative from a group that is similar or different from the participant’s
organization. As a result, the inclusion condition can be collapsed with regards to these
analyses. Secondly, and more importantly, these ratings represent first impressions o f the
speaker which may be more likely to detect inherent gender bias without the influence of
other manipulations that are created later in the scenario.
However, gender was not fidly crossed with the model because opposite sex
confederates with fraternities and sororities would invalidate specific cells (e.g., a female
claiming to be a fraternity member). Therefore, specific subsets of the sample had to be
compared to examine potential bias differences due to gender o f the actor. A split file ttest analysis was conducted separating gender of the actor within in-group and out-group
manipulations. In other words, within both in-group manipulation groups and out-group
manipulation groups, initial male and female speaker ratings were compared for each
gender receiving the message.
Results within the in-group manipulations indicate that female actors were rated
equivalently by both men and women (Male = 6.9 versus Female = 7.3, /(l,39.9) = -1.31,
p = .19), but male actors were rated significantly better by female participants compared
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to males (Female = 8.8 versus Male = 7.2 ; t{1,32) = -2.60, p = .01). Results for
organizations provided with an out-group speaker could only be compared with female
actors, as male actors were not available for these groups. Results indicate that men and
women again rated female actors equivalently (Male = 7.35 versus Female = 7.18, t(l,75)
- .535, p = .60).
In sum and with the analyses available, results do not indicate any influence due
to what is typically considered sexist or misogynistic ideology that would result in female
actors being rated more negatively by men compared to women. However, male actors
were rated more positively by female participants. Because this specific finding with
females actually contributes to a more conservative analysis, and because HLM accounts
for differences in slopes across groups, gender was not controlled for in the model.
Participant’s Perception of Group Membership and Message
The following perceptions represent participants’ beliefs about their organization
as well as their sense of prototypicallity before the manipulation was presented, but after
participants were fully informed that another organization had disapproved o f them.
Overall, participants reported that their beliefs and actions were very typical of the
groups’ beliefs and actions (M = 9.33, SD = 2.29)
In contrast to relatively positive beliefs about group membership, participants’
ratings were negative for the presented message. Out of a possible positive score o f 13,
participants did not like any o f our 4 manipulation messages (M - 2.73, SD - 2.32), and
did not rate the content o f the message as convincing (M = 3.75, SD = 3.05) or
representing quality arguments (M= 4.47, SD = 2.95). In essence, participants accurately
perceived that the message presented to them was not a well thought out argument, but
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rather represented an emotional presentation that blatantly accused the group o f elitist
behavior.
Perception of Source
Several questions were embedded in the survey to determine the perception, if
any, of our manipulations. With regards to participants’ perception o f the messenger as
an in-group or out-group member, there was no significant difference between how
similar participants perceived themselves to the in-group speaker compared to the out
group speaker (5.88 versus 5.59, r(l,179) = .105,p = .42). However, participants did
report overall greater degrees of anger (8.0 versus 5.8, /( l,179) - 3.88 p = .000) and
emotional upset (8.9 versus 7.2, /(l, 179)= 3.12, p = .002) in the in-group condition
compared to the out-group condition. Similarly, participants demonstrated a trend
towards liking the message less so from an in-group member (2.4 versus 3.0, r(l,179) = 1.77, p = .09). Although the source manipulation did not seem to alter participants’
feelings o f similarity towards die speaker, greater upset and less liking strongly suggest a
“black sheep” effect. More specifically, the speaker’s perceived membership in a similar
group resulted in feelings of betrayal, and subsequently worse ratings compared to an
out-group member (Homsey & Imani, 2004).
Perception of Inclusion
Mean scores were calculated between groups where only a few members o f a
group (low inclusion) are accused versus the entire group (high inclusion) for the
following survey question, “To what extent do you think that the speaker’s statements
apply to everyone in your group?” Results showed that participants perceived the
message as more applicable or likely when the threat applied to only a few members of
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Preliminary Analyses: Identity and In-Group Focused Elaborations.
Our second series o f preliminary analyses concerns any relationship between the
identity o f an individual participant towards a particular organization and the degree of
in-group related statements made (H10). In order to examine the general relationship a
Pearson correlation was performed. Results indicated no relationship between the
variables (r = -.068 p = .36). However, similar to our analysis with identity and argument
statements, any potential correlational relationship could be confounded by differential
association between identity and group focused statements due to the different conditions
presented to participants across groups. Again, a 2-Level HLM model was employed to
test this possibility, which more importantly, allows us to examine if in-group focused
elaborations significantly differ due to manipulation conditions of source and inclusion
(H9).
Preliminary Fit of HLM Model: Group-Focused Statements. Examination o f an
unspecified HLM model indicates an ICC (r) of .077 indicating that approximately 8% of
variation for in-group focused statements resided between groups. The Muthen et al.,
(2006) statistic for sufficient between group variation yielded a score of 2.08, (> 2.00)
indicating barely sufficient variation to use HLM in subsequent analyses. Reported
deviance for the unspecified model was 70.27.
Inclusion of identity as a predictor in the model did not significantly reduce
model deviation (70.27 versus 69.02, x2 (1,11) = 1.24,p = .27). Inclusion o f Level 2
predictors similarly did not produce a significant reduction in deviance (69.02 versus
67.43, x2 (4,8) = 1.58, p > .50). Thus, neither the inclusion of identity nor the addition of
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inclusion and source significantly improved the fit of the HLM model. However, these
terms were retained in the model to demonstrate general hypotheses.
Identity. Inclusion, and Source as Predictors of Group Focused Statements. In
order to examine the potential effects o f identity, inclusion, and source as mediators of
group focused statements a two level HLM model was employed with identity as a
subject level predictor, and inclusion and source as Level 2 predictors. Reliability for
this model was .44, and approximately 92% of the between level variation and 7% of
total model variation was explained with the addition o f these predictors to the model.
Both HLM and OLS results are reported in Table 6 .
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TABLE 6

HLM
Coefficient S.E.

Fixed Effect

LEVEL 2 Intercept PO
INTRCPT2, yOO
INCLUS, yOl
SOURCE, y02
LEVEL 1Identity pi
INTRCPT2, ylO
INCLUS, y ll
SOURCE, y!2

OLS
/-ratio /7-value

Coefficient S.E.

/-ratio

/7-value

0.47
-0.07
0.01

0.05
0.06
0.06

8.64
-1.21
0.17

0.000
0.258
0.865

0.45
-0.07
0.03

0.03
0.04
0.04

11.61
-1.66
0.74

0.000
0.098
0.456

-0.01
-0.00
-0.01

0.03
0.03
0.03

-0.30
-0.14
-0.39

0.764
0.887
0.694

-0.01
-0.00
-0.01

0.03
0.03
0.03

-0.29
-0.13
-0.38

0.771
0.891
0.702

Final estimation of variance components:

^
00

S.D.
Level-2,
Level-1,

0.07
0.29

sJ
0.006
0.081

X2

/7 - v a lu e

22.13 .009
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HLM and OLS Estimates of Identity, Inclusion, and Source Towards Predicting Group Focused Statements

Regarding both main effects and identity as a subject level predictor, results did
not indicate any significance regarding identity and group focused statements. As such,
in-group focused statements did not significantly differ due to salience manipulations,
and identity did not significantly predict group-focused statements. Given the small
amount of between group variation, examination of subject level analyses confirms these
findings, where significant differences were not demonstrated in the subject level model.
Primary HLM Model: Identity. Group%. and Arg% as Predictors of Negative and
Positive Responses
Preliminary Fit of HLM Model: Negative Statements. The examination o f an
unspecified HLM model with negative statements presented as an outcome variable
indicated an ICC (r) of .16, meaning that 16% of variation for negative statements resides
between groups. Applying the Muthen et al., (2006) formula for sufficient between group
variation provides a score of 3.23, indicating sufficient variation to use HLM in
subsequent analyses. Reported deviance for the unspecified model was 97.38.
Inclusion of identity, argument centered statements, and in-group focused
statements, subject level predictors produced a significant reduction in model deviation
(97.38 versus 62.24, x2 (1,11) = 35.53,p = .001). The inclusion of Level 2 predictors of
inclusion and source also significantly reduced model deviation (62.24 versus 44.30, x2
(4,8) = 17.93 ,p = .02). Thus, in each step the addition o f both Level 1 and Level 2
predictors of negative statements increased the overall fit of the model.
Finally, the inclusion o f an interaction term of Inclusion X Source examining
mean differences did significantly reduce variation (44.30 versus 40.03, x2 (1,12) =
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3.19,p =. 05), and the interaction term was significant (p = .02). However, reliability for
this model was exceedingly low (.001) indicating a very poor fit. As such, the interaction
term for this model was removed from the analysis, but the reader is cautioned that a 2 way interaction of inclusion and source with regards to negative statements is likely, but
untenable as a fitted variable in the HLM model.
Primary HLM Model; Identity. Arguments, and Group Focused Statements as
Predictors of Negative Statements.
In order to examine the potential effects o f identity, argument centered statements
made, and group centered statements made, inclusion, and source as predictors of
negative statements made, a two level HLM model was employed with identity,
argument centered statements, and group centered statements as a subject level
predictors, and inclusion and source as Level 2 predictors. This primary HLM model
will address whether or not (H4) central processing is inversely related to the amount of
negative statements made, (H5) out-group manipulations produce more negative
statements compared to in-group manipulations due to central and peripheral processing,
(H6 ) low inclusion manipulations produce less negative statements compared to high
inclusion manipulations due to central and peripheral processing, (H7) identity is
inversely related to the amount of negative statements made, (H 8 ) in-group focused
statements are inversely related to the amount o f negative statements made, and (HI 1) in
group focused elaborations differentially predict the amount of negative statements made
due to salience manipulations. Reliability for this model was .52, and approximately
62% of the between level variation, and

10

% o f total model variation was explained with
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the addition of these subject level persuasion and identity predictors to the model. The
outcome o f both HLM and OLS predictive analyses are reported in Table 7.
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TABLE 7

HLM
S.E.
/-ratio
Coefficient

Fixed Effect
LEVEL 2 Intercept pO
INTRCPT2, yOO
INCLUS, yOl
SOURCE, y02
LEVEL 1Identity pi
INTRCPT2, ylO
INCLUS, yll
SOURCE, yl2
LEVEL 1Argument P2
INTRCPT2, y20
INCLUS, y21
SOURCE, y22
LEVEL 1Group Sts P3
INTRCPT2, y30
INCLUS, y31
SOURCE, y32

/7-value

Level-2,
Level-1,

0.08253
0.22645

/>-value

0.34
0.12
-0.02

0.05
0.06
0.06

6.12
1.92
-0.35

0.000
0.086
0.732

0.37
0.14
-0.07

0.03
0.04
0.04

10.09
3.49
-1.79

0.000
0.001
0.074

0.03
0.02
-0.07

0.03
0.03
0.03

1.10
0.79
-2.22

0.271
0.426
0.028

0.03
0.02
-0.07

0.03
0.03
0.03

1.05
0.76
-2.12

0.292
0.446
0.035

-0.33
0.46
-0.36

0.14
0.17
0.17

-2.39
2.62
-2.03

0.018
0.010
0.043

-0.33
0.46
-0.36

0.14
0.18
0.18

-2.29
2.50
-1.95

0.023
0.013
0.052

-0.40
0.06
0.17

0.14
0.16
0.16

-2.84
0.38
1.06

0.005
0.700
0.290

-0.40
0.06
0.17

0.14
0.16
0.16

-2.72
0.36
1.01

0.007
0.712
0.311

Final estimation of variance components:
S.D.

OLS
S.E.
/-ratio
Coefficient

s2
0.00681
0.07100

3C2

/7 -v a lu e

17.93 .02
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HLM and OLS Estimates of Identity, Argument %, Group %, Inclusion, and Source Towards Predicting Negative Statements

Regarding mean differences, results only indicated a trend (y = .12, p = .086) for
inclusion. This finding indicates that high inclusion messages tend to demonstrate
greater amounts of negative statements, in partial support of our hypotheses regarding
expected mean differences in negative statements due to salience manipulations (H 6 ).
However, results also demonstrate that out-groups and in-groups do not affect the amount
of negative statements produced (H5).
Contrary to our hypotheses, identity was not a significant general predictor of
participants’ negative statements (H7), but results indicate a significant interaction
between identity and the source of the message towards predicting negative statements (y
= -.07,/? = .028).This interaction can be seen in Figure 2. As the figure demonstrates,
participants within groups who perceived the speaker as an in-group member
demonstrate a strong tendency towards greater amounts o f negative statements regarding
the speaker or argument depending on participant’s greater or lesser degrees of
identification with the group in question. In stark contrast, individuals within groups who
were presented a statement by an out-group member tend to present less negative
statements in association with greater amounts o f individual identity.
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FIGURE 2. Figure o f the Interaction ofIdentity and Source Towards Predicting Negative
Statements.
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With regards to argument centered statements, results indicate a significant
overall relationship with negative statements made (y = -.33, p = .018) indicating that as
less argument centered statements are made (and person oriented statements increase),
greater amounts of negative statements are presented (H4). This general relationship is
qualified by two significant interactions of argument centered statements for both
inclusion (y = .46, p = .01) and source of the message (y = -.36, p =.043). These
interactions can be seen in Figures 3 and 4.
As can be seen in Figure 3, negative statements decrease as arguments increase
when individuals within groups received a threat regarding only a few specific members
in their organization. In contrast, those who heard a high inclusive statement threatening
the entire group showed an essentially constant degree o f negativity regardless of the
degree o f statements that focused on the argument made. This finding confirms that
central and peripheral processing differ as a function o f inclusion (H6 ).
With regards to source o f the message, Figure 4 shows that when a message was
presented by an in-group member, negative statements only slightly decreased as
statements focusing on the arguments o f the message increased. In contrast, when the
message was presented by an out-group member, negative statements sharply decreased
as participants focused on argument orientated statements. This finding confirms that
central and peripheral processing differ as a function o f source (H5).
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FIGURE 3. Figure o f the Interaction o f Argument % and Inclusion Towards Predicting
Negative Statements.
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FIGURE 4. Figure o f the Interaction o f Argument % and Source Towards Predicting
Negative Statements.
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Finally, group focused statements demonstrate a significant predictive relationship with
negative statements (y = -.40, p = .005) indicating that as group focused statements
decrease, (and out-group focused statements increase) negative statements increase (H8 ).
Neither inclusion or source interacted with group focused statements disconfirming our
expectation that in-group focused statements would differentially predict negative
statements as a function of the current studies salience manipulations (HI 1).
Results Section 3; Persistence of Belief and Value; Identity. Inclusion. Source
Preliminary Analysis of Gronp Differences
In order to examine potential group differences due to group type, our final series
of one-way ANOVAs were conducted within each manipulation type for residual bias
and value. Again Tukey post-hoc tests were employed to determine any significant
differences within manipulation types. For residual bias only the high inclusion/out
group condition was significant (F(2,35) = 4.423, p = .019). Subsequent examination of
the groups within this condition indicate that the advocacy group in this condition
retained significantly more bias than either the fraternity or religious group (-4.369 versus
-3.058 and -0.389,p ’s = < .05). For residual value, only the high inclusion/out-group
condition approached significance (F(2,57) = 3.008, p = .057). Subsequent examination
o f the groups within this manipulation indicated that the sorority within this group had
more positive scores regarding value of their own group compared to the advocacy group
within this condition (.265 versus -1.400, p = .048). No other differences were evident or
significant. Again, due to a lack o f significant differences and consistent differences
across conditions, no dummy codes were created for subsequent analyses.

93

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

General Analyses: Does Bias and Value Persist?
In order to examine our general belief persistence hypotheses that bias persisted
after participants were informed of the non-veridical nature of the statements, I employed
two subject level repeated measures t-tests examining initial ratings o f the speaker versus
post-ratings o f the speaker. Likewise, initial ratings of perceived group value were tested
in the same manner against post manipulation ratings of perceived group value. These
tests examine whether or not (HI 2 ) bias persisted after participants were informed o f the
fictitious nature o f the threat, and (HI 3) if reduction in perceived value reverted back to
initial pre-threat levels.
Results indicate that ratings of the speaker slightly, but significantly, increased
after being informed that the statement was fictitious (7.37 versus 7.80, /( l,179) = -2.664,
p = .008) indicating that bias did not persist, but actually lessened compared to initial
ratings (H I2). Conversely, results indicate that participants reported significantly less
belief in the inherent goodness or ‘Value” of their group (10.22 versus 9.92, /(l, 179) =
2.11 l,_p = .04), indicating a reduction o f group value that persisted from the manipulation
ratings (9.95 versus 9.92, t (1,179) = .234 p = .815), despite information discrediting the
message presented (H I3). Note that these significant differences represent very small
changes in ratings, and as such should be viewed cautiously in terms of practical
implications.
Exploratory Analyses; Identity. Inclusion, and Source Towards Predicting
Remaining Bias and Value
Preliminary Fit of HLM Model: Residual Bias. Examination of an unspecified
HLM model indicates an ICC (r) of .08 indicating that 8 % of variation for residual bias
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resides between groups. Applying Muthen et al.’s, (2006) formula for sufficient between
group variation provides a score of 2.12, indicating sufficient variation to use HLM in
subsequent analyses. Reported deviance for the unspecified model was 825.26.
Inclusion of identity as a predictor to the model produced a significant reduction
in model deviation (825.26 versus 820.35, x2 (1,11) = 4.90,p - .02), however, inclusion
o f Level 2 predictors did not produce a significant reduction in deviance (820.34 versus
816. 74, x2 (4,8) = 3.57, p > .50). Thus, both the predictor only model and the full model
including both identity and inclusion and source towards predicting residual bias are
significantly better fits than the unspecified model, but the addition of inclusion and
source do not significantly contribute more so than just identity as a predictor. Finally,
the inclusion o f an interaction term of Inclusion X Source did not significantly reduce
variation (816.77 versus 816.73, x2 (1,11) = -04,p > .50), and was not significant (p =
.70). As such, the interaction term o f inclusion and source was not included in the
subsequent model.
Primary HLM Model: Identity. Inclusion, and Source as Predictors of Residual Bias
In order to examine the potential effects o f identity, inclusion, and source as
mediators o f residual bias a two level HLM model was employed with identity as a
subject level predictor, and inclusion and source as Level 2 predictors. Reliability for
this model was .33, and approximately 60% o f the between level variation, and 5% of
total model variation was explained with the addition o f these predictors to the model.
Both HLM and OLS results are reported in Table 8 .
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TABLE 8

HLM and OLS Estimates of Identity, Inclusion, and Source Towards Predicting Residual In-Group Bias
Fixed Effect
LEVEL 2 Intercept po
INTRCPT2, yOO
INCLUS, yOl
SOURCE, y02
LEVEL 1Identity pi
INTRCPT2, ylO
INCLUS, yll
SOURCE, yl2

OLS
/(-value

/7-value

0.38
0.46
0.46

-4.35
-1.85
-0.47

0.002
0.096
0.648

-1.77
-0.92
-0.18

0.30
0.35
0.35

-5.75
-2.61
-0.52

0.000
0.010
0.601

-0.54
0.16
0.22

0.27
0.30
0.30

-1.96
0.54
0.75

0.050
0.586
0.454

-0.54
0.16
0.22

0.28
0.31
0.31

-1.93
0.53
0.73

0.054
0.592
0.461

S.D.
.45581
2.30659

/-ratio

-1.69
-0.85
-0.21

Final estimation of variance components:

Level-2,
Level-1,

Coefficient S.E.

^

On

X2

0.20776
5.32035

20.62

/7-value

.014
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HLM
/-ratio
Coefficient S.E.

Regarding main effects, results only indicated a trend (y = -.85,p = .096) for
residual bias scores to be lower for groups who received a low inclusion message
compared to those groups who received a high inclusion message.
Identity was a significant inverse predictor o f residual bias (y = -.54, p = .05)
indicating that as individual levels of identity for participants increased, subsequent
remaining bias towards the speaker was greater. Identity did not significantly interact
with inclusion or source for this model.
Preliminary Fit of HLM Model: Residual Values. Finally, in order to determine
if the lack of change in value was specifically due to one o f our salience manipulations, a
2 Level HLM model was employed to test this possibility. Examination o f an
unspecified HLM model indicates an ICC (r) o f .03 indicating that 3% o f variation for
residual beliefs about group-value resides between groups. Applying the Muthen et al.,
(2006) formula for sufficient between group variation provides a score o f 1.42 (< 2.00),
indicating that between group variation is sufficiently small to use ordinary least squares
techniques to examine potential differences in the variables.
P rim ary HLM Model: Identity. Inclusion, and Source as Predictors of Residual

Values
In order to examine the potential effects of identity, inclusion, and source as
mediators o f residual bias an ordinary least squares model was employed examining
identity, inclusion, and source as subject level predictors or residual group value beliefs.
Results o f the Level 1 analysis are provided in Table 9. Examinations of the results
indicate that none of the predictors significantly predicted residual value.
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TABLE 9

HLM and OLS Estimates of Identity, Inclusion, and Source Towards Predicting Residual Value

LEVEL 2 Intercept PO
INTRCPT2, yOO
INCLUS, yOl
SOURCE, y02
LEVEL 1Identity pi
INTRCPT2, ylO
INCLUS, y ll
SOURCE, y!2

OLS
/j-value

Coefficient S.E.

/-ratio

/i-value

-0.28
0.29
-0.41

0.24
0.28
0.28

-1.15
1.06
-1.46

0.251
0.291
0.145

-0.22
0.07
0.27

0.22
0.24
0.24

-0.99
0.30
1.11

0.322
0.758
0.265
oo

On
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Fixed Effect

HLM
Coefficient S.E.
/-ratio

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

Overall Findings and Comparison of IRT Conditions
The current study examined the well researched theories of Social Identity
Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and Self-Categorization Theory (Turner et al., 1987)
within a new environmental context. I examined the process and elaboration of threat
messages within realistic settings where individual participants within organizations were
exposed to immediate and personally relevant threat messages (e.g., IRT). Our initial
assumptions were that previous findings would apply to situations where (a) participants
were recruited from pre-existing student organizations from differing ideologies, (b) a
threat message was applied in the context of a mediation procedure sponsored by the
campus, and (c) the nature of the presented message directly criticized the character and
good behavior o f the target group. Our specific findings demonstrate that personally
relevant threat in realistic situations does not necessarily mimic previous laboratory
findings (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel et al., 1971), nor do results necessarily correspond to
experimental scenarios where pre-existing associations such as gender or nationality are
used as in-groups and out-groups (e.g. Haslam et al., 1992; McGarty et al., 1994; Oakes
et al., 1991). Although specific findings and their likely causes are explained in
subsequent sections, these findings within the context of an IRT scenario are likely due to
one of two new environmental conditions o f this study, including pre-existing ideology
adherence and personally applied threat.
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As discussed previously, one of the recently debated issues within the social
identity literature (see Turner & Reynolds, 2003) is the generalizability o f SIT and SCT
principals of salient contrast in the context o f individual difference measures such as
social dominance orientation (Pratto et al., 1999). Proponents o f the attitude measures
suggest that higher or lower concentrations o f these individuals serve to mediate or
explain the process o f bias creation explained by SCT (see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). In
contrast, proponents of SCT have shown that principals of salient contrast will apply
generally and broadly across groups and organizations, and attitudinal individual traits
function within the context o f salient contrast (Schmitt et al., 2003). The current study
attempted to explore and validate these SCT findings, by examining the degrees of bias,
persuasion, and belief and bias persistence inherent in different kinds o f ideological
organizations.
Our results, although not definitive by any means, demonstrate that differing
ideological groups respond similarly to other groups, at least with regards to threat.
Across our dependent variables o f bias, persuasion, and residual bias, responses were
generally the same for differing types o f organizations. Thus, these findings provide
initial evidence that in the context o f salient contrast between groups (e.g. Haslam et al.,
1996; Haslam et al., 1999), differing ideologies and norms are irrelevant when
examining bias and evaluation o f threat. There are several implications to these findings.
A lack of ideological differences in the context o f a situation where radically
differing types o f groups, for instance, a fraternity compared to ideologically dependent
groups such as advocacy rights or religious groups, provides general support for SCT
principals. In support o f Turner et al. (1987) and numerous subsequent studies (i.e.,
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Haslam et al., 1995; Haslam et al., 1996; Haslam et al., 1999; Oakes et al., 1991),
intragroup differentiation does seem to be a function of the immediate environment and
salient contrast, and not pre-existing ideology when dealing with threats from other
groups. Similarly, a lack o f differences in these findings supports general principals of
social identity theory by supporting a general need to maintain a positive image o f the
group to bolster individual self-esteem.
In contrast, these findings do somewhat rule out a trait explanation of bias, at
least in the sense that individual types o f groups may contain members that hold specific
norms or beliefs that make them more likely to engage in bias and prejudice. However,
our findings do not rule out the possibility that individuals within pre-existing
organizations may believe in social superiority. Rather, it is likely that either beliefs in
inherent superiority do not manifest within IRT salient contrast or that all o f these groups
contain similar amounts of individuals with these beliefs or similar amounts o f these
beliefs across groups. As such, further research is necessary to fully explain these
findings with regards to specific bias associated traits. Replication of the current study
with measures such as social dominance orientation, or perhaps authoritarianism
(Altemeyer, 1981; 1988) would provide more definitive results along these lines.
More interestingly, these results do imply some other tentative conclusions
involving ideology. One way to interpret these findings is that regardless o f the specific
ideology, different groups generally respond the same to conflict and threat situations.
As such, these results imply that although the individual need to belong to a group is
important, the ideological content of group membership is interchangeable with regards
to threat. Consequently, each individual’s need to belong to a specific group dictates
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his/her reaction to threat that is not necessarily due to specific cherished beliefs that
promote or inhibit bias. Although current descriptions of identity are defined as
superordinate to ideology, these findings support a generalizable component o f human
nature towards belonging and protecting what is similar or defining to themselves. This
need to protect groups that individuals cherish could potentially vary from individual to
individual, but causes individuals to react the same to others who do not share an in
group’s belief. Future researchers may wish to examine the degree to which people need
to define themselves by organizations and characteristics, in relation to the differing
types of groups that participants select. Should results demonstrate similar reactions
towards other groups, regardless of ideologically defining characteristics, then findings
would support the concept that ideology is interchangeable, and essentially, all ideologies
respond to threat in a similar way. In sum, the current research provides initial evidence
that regardless of the content o f beliefs as either condoned, supported, currently socially
approved or otherwise, groups generally respond the same to threat and conflict.
With regards to immediate and relevant threat, the current study was the first to
employ a message that directly targeted the well-being and behavior of a group in
question. Two overall themes of the research seem evident, due to the implementation of
IRT. First, the current research strongly suggests that a primary tenant of SCT, namely
situation specific self-categorization (Turner et al., 1987), does in fact operate within pre
existing environmentally valid situations. The overall examination o f results regarding
bias and persuasion demonstrate that participants will often re-categorize conceptions of
in-group and out-group distinctions, not necessarily on established concepts o f in-groups
and out-groups based on membership, but rather the content o f the message that
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determines the favorability of another group towards the target group. A simple way to
put this is that the “squeaky wheel gets the biased response” regardless of whether or not
the message comes from an in-group or out-group representative. There are, however,
several caveats with this statement, which are discussed in subsequent sections.
A second theme found is that correlations performed at the subject level, as well
as subsequent HLM analyses, do not show a hypothesized relationship between identity
and central and peripheral processing, nor does identity relate to the degree o f group
focused statements made (a premise based on the assumption of salient contrast and high
and low identifiers; Branscombe et al., 1999). This finding is unexpected, and several
reasons are possible. One potential cause includes differing forms of measurement from
how identity and persuasion variables are traditionally defined (these issues are also
discussed in relevant sections below). It is also the case that the overall lack of this
relationship was not due to IRT conditions. Comparison of traditional statistics with
HLM models regarding this relationship suggests that variation due to differing groups is
not responsible for the lack o f the relationship. Likewise the manipulations did not appear
to confound a potential relationship between identity and these other variables.
One potential explanation for these findings suggests a hierarchical relationship
between the evaluation o f a message, in-group bias and identity. An examination of
Table 2 demonstrates that all o f our persuasive components that were evaluated (i.e.,
Negative%, Argument%, and Group%) are significantly related to in-group bias in the
expected direction. In contrast, identity (as it was measured in the study) only
significantly related to in-group bias. These relationships could suggest that evaluative
components o f a message are mediated by in-group bias with regards to identity. Thus,
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identity predicts trait evaluation o f the speaker of a message, but it is the initial opinion
of the speaker due to identity, that helps determine the cognitive evaluation and outcomes
o f what the speaker presents. This explanation is potentially interesting, as it suggests
that initial stimulus regarding salient contrast is the first and primary component of
message evaluation (as has been argued, see McGarty et al., 1994, for an example) that
dictates persuasive outcomes. However, a formal test o f this possibility would involve
subsequent studies where mediation analyses could be conducted without the confound
of differing salience manipulations.
Discussion: In-Group Bias and Pre-Existing Groups
The current examination o f in-group bias created in a immediate and relevant
threat scenario with pre-existing groups demonstrated several interesting findings, most
of which were contrary to our hypotheses. Generally, our findings show that source did
not significantly alter the amount o f bias generated by groups, although an examination
of identity demonstrates differences in the slopes of identity to out-groups and in-groups
regarding bias. However, inclusion did produce significant differences in bias, and in the
direction expected, where low inclusion threats produced less bias than high inclusion
threats.
With regards to source manipulations where messages were presented by either
an organization with similar or differing ideologies, the current experiment did not detect
significant mean differences. This finding is in direct contrast to early MGP findings
(Brewer, 1979; Tajfel et al., 1971) and later research involving more complex and non
monetary exchange designs (Hogg et al., 1995; Turner et al., 1987). However, the
current findings do not invalidate previous studies that have consistently demonstrated
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differential degrees o f bias due to message source. Rather, it is more likely the result of
the increased threat conditions of IRT compared to previous research. Previous research
has examined more abstract group conditions of nationality, gender, or school
membership (Haslam et al., 1995; Oakes et al., 1991). The current study employed a
direct and immediate threat towards the “good reputation” of various groups. This type of
scenario not only represents what is more typically received by organizations that take
stances on religious or political ideologies, but also represents a direct and valid attack on
individuals’ perceptions o f the group to which they belong and the relevant self-esteem
derived by their membership (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
As such, one potential explanation of a lack o f bias differentiation between
different sources is due to the fact that another organization complaining or criticizing a
group will override any similarity derived from similar ideologies. In terms o f salient
contrast and SCT (Tinner et al., 1987), salient contrast is viewed as dependent on the
situation and also functions under the cognitive mechanisms of comparative and
normative fit. As stated previously, Haslam and Turner (1992) demonstrated that
Australians rated Americans poorly when they were the only group to contrast against.
However, when other groups were present to contrast against, Americans were rated
much less poorly, due to other groups’ stronger differences from the in-group.
Our lack of mean bias differences due to source manipulation would suggest two
levels of abstraction and comparative fit. The less abstract (and immediately relevant)
level of salient contrast would represent a criticizing group versus a group being
criticized. Salient differentiation in this case is based on strong and salient contrast
centered on the beliefs that the target group believes in the goodness of its organization,
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whereas the group presenting the message does not. As such, the group in question
preserves its sense of self-esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) by differentiating itself from
the representative o f the other group. The second and more abstract level represents the
manipulations that were presented by claiming that the representative was a member of a
group o f very similar or very different ideologies. Simply put, the immediate relevancy
o f threat to the group was more relevant to target organizations than the similarity o f the
group threatening them.
These findings however, do not clearly lend themselves to normative fit at first
glance. As Oakes et al. (1991) demonstrated, behavior that is considered inconsistent
with another group inhibits groups’ perceptions of group cohesion. In turn, this lack of fit
can minimize bias by inhibiting the perception of the group in question as “prototypical”.
In this particular case a perceived in-group or similar group, would not in theory criticize
a group that shares similar goals and beliefs. What seems a likely exception to this rule
is when normative fit is exceptionally poor. Strong criticism seems very unlikely from an
individual o f similar ideology or membership. As a result, a black sheep effect (Hornsey
& Imani, 2004) occurred to account for such a large discrepancy between expected and
actual espoused beliefs of the representative speaker.
Essentially, the current findings, although not immediately consistent with
previous findings regarding the source o f a message, can be explained under the current
conception o f self-categorization theory. The likelihood of this interpretation is furthered
by two current findings. First, the examination o f participants’ perception o f the source
o f the message were demonstrated by differential degrees of anger and upset reported by
participants that further support research demonstrating a black sheep effect (Hornsey &
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Imani, 2004). Participants expressed more anger and upset when a message was
presented by an in-group member. Second, although our results did not demonstrate
mean differences with regards to source and bias, there was a trend (p = .057) for identity
to interact with the source o f the message. Across target groups, out-groups
demonstrated a slight downward slope towards greater bias as identity increased. In
contrast, a steep inverse slope existed with identity and in-group representatives with
regards to bias. Individual participants who did not have high degrees o f identity
invested within the target group tended to rate an in-group speaker much less negatively
in contrast to those who did have high degrees of identity. This finding supports our
expectation that high identifiers perceive threat as threat, regardless of the source o f the
message. As can be seen in Figure 1, high-identifiers rated in-group and out-group
messages equally negatively. As such, these findings suggest that high identifiers’
increased investment within a group results in a backlash towards threat. Both in-group
sources and out-group sources o f criticism in this case represent an attack on an
organization from which high-identifiers derive meaning and self-esteem. As such,
either the heathen (e.g., out-group) or heretic (e.g., in-group) deserves scorn.
There are also other interesting implications regarding this interaction of the
source o f the message and amount of bias evoked. Regardless o f identity, groups that
were identified as dissimilar did not vary widely across identity. Although the slope is
not large, this finding supports Branscome et al. (1999) and Spears et al. (1999) in their
research showing significant differences in bias for low and high identity members
towards out-group sources. Interestingly, differences in in-group messages and out
group messages for low identifiers lend further support to these authors’ conception of
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low identifiers as instrumental in their membership goals. With an in-group source, low
identifiers would not see any pragmatic gain for themselves by defending the group.
Furthermore, one distinct possibility is that low-identifiers actually identified more with
the individual complaining who supposedly comes from another organization of similar
background. Out-group sources were perceived negatively by low-identifiers, but not
nearly as negatively as high-identifiers, suggesting that low-identifiers did not see as
much of an opportunity to further personal goals with an out-group source as compared
to a similar other group source. In essence, one way to interpret these differences in bias
for low-identifiers is that in-group sources provided similarity and perhaps advocacy for
a low-identifier who may not be entirely happy with his or her organization. In contrast,
low-identifiers did not perceive an opportunity to further group or personal goals when
threat messages were presented by an out-group member, but due to a weak affiliation
with the group, were not as upset by the criticism (Doosje al.,. 2002).
In broader terms, bias variation for high and low identifiers in the group is
generally explained by a black sheep effect (Hornsey & Imani, 2004) where individuals
who were not deeply invested in a group did not feel as threatened by the active criticism
o f another group of similar ideals. As a result, it seems likely that the perception o f the
representative as an in-group member maintained relevant salience; the presented
criticism from the in-group member was not as threatening to the individual’s sense of
self that if not derived from the group in question, may be derived from other groups or
sources. In a similar vein, low identifiers may have actually sympathized with the
representative, potentially assuming that the individual presenting the threat themselves
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did not strongly identify with his/her own group, otherwise, he or she would not be
willing to criticize a similar other group.
Although the source manipulations did not achieve significant main differences
across groups, our new and experimental manipulation o f inclusion of threat did
demonstrate significant and expected mean differences. Specifically, representatives who
presented low inclusion threats produced significantly less bias compared to messages
that were applied to groups as a whole. Reynolds al. (2000) demonstrated that the
typicality of traits towards a group affects the amount o f bias created towards out-groups.
We in turn, interpreted this finding to suggest that the more a threat is generalized
towards a group, the more likely greater bias will ensue. These findings present several
interesting possibilities.
The concept of typicality (e.g., Reynolds al., 2000) was based on mechanisms of
meta-contrast (Turner al., 1987) as a function o f comparative and normative fit (Oakes
al., 1991). In the case presented by Reynolds et al. (2000), typicality was induced by
examining participant fit o f positive and negative applicable traits that either did or did
not actually exist in the tested populations. For instance, the adjective o f piety would be
applicable and existent for a religious organization, but not accurately apply to a
fraternity. Oakes et al. (1991) have previously demonstrated that non-typical behavior
from an out-group can, in certain situations, inhibit in-group bias, because expectations
o f out-group behavior do not match the expected comparative fit between groups. In
contrast, the current study altered the message presented to target participants in hopes of
altering typicality of a threat from a non-internal source, regardless o f its actual
applicability. Thus, these findings suggest that the perceived typicality o f a threat can be
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falsely induced from an external source, regardless o f the participant’s perception of the
veridicality o f the statement itself. Given that a broadly applied application o f a threat
produced more bias on average than a threat targeting a few members of the group, the
inclusion o f a persuasive message can serve to exacerbate or lessen salient contrast and
subsequent bias in a manner that is consistent with principals o f comparative and
normative fit.
However, there is an important caveat regarding this interpretation. First, the
current research regarding speaker induced typicality (e.g., inclusion) does not imply that
participant evaluated typicality (e.g., actual applicability of the threat) contributed to
these results. In other words, results suggest that participants did view a group inclusive
threat as more salient than a targeted threat, but that does not mean that participants
themselves did not evaluate the message in terms o f its likelihood. Consider the
possibility that individual participants within a group may not believe that “elitist
behavior” is in fact typical of the group, however, the speaker presenting a message in an
immediate and relevant scenario could have potential consequences to the group’s overall
well being. As such, a high inclusion manipulation induced greater amounts o f threat,
but not necessarily a threat that was believed as typical of the group. Our earlier
manipulation checks support this interpretation, as participants reported a low inclusion
threat as more “typical” o f group members than a high inclusion threat, in essence,
supporting Reynolds et al.’s (2000) findings.
What our inclusion manipulations do suggest is what is defined as “superordinate
identity categorization” (Reynolds et al., 2000, p 6 6 ). Following the principals of
abstraction as defined by SCT (Turner et al., 1987), threat created by externally inducing

110

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

typicality overrides internal participant perceptions of typicality as a prominent salient
mechanism. As such, future research should more closely examine externally versus
internally applied typicality within both IRT and less threatening conditions to further
substantiate these findings.
In summation, our examination of bias from an IRT scenario provides several
general implications for the reaction of pre-existing groups in situations where hostile
other groups are present. Results suggest that out-group presenters of unpopular
information will receive more bias towards them, but in-group presenters of unpopular
information will create overall less bias with members who are less identified with the
target group. Thus, groups o f low-identity members may better receive criticisms from
other in-group members than high identifiers. Second, criticisms placed towards a few
specific members are more likely to reduce bias than global criticisms against the whole
group. These results suggest that the conflict situation that will create the least bias is
represented by an in-group member presenting a criticism towards a few specific
members. Similarly, the best reception to a hostile message will occur when the majority
o f members within a target organization are not personally and highly identified with the
target group in question.
Discussion: Persuasion. Identity, and Cognitive Elaboration
The examination of persuasion and cognitive elaboration with regards to social
identity and threat followed several different avenues, many of which provided several
interesting findings within an IRT scenario. Our general examination of persuasion
demonstrated that identity as measured by the Luthanen & Crocker (1992) subscale of
personal identity did not relate to either central or peripheral processing, nor to the degree
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to which individuals focused on in-group or out-group elaborations. Although in earlier
sections o f the discussion we discussed the possibility o f a mediation relationship
between message evaluation, bias, and identity, we discuss further possibilities of this
relationship in the current section.
With regards to our measurement of identity and the association with central and
peripheral statements and group focused statements, our findings are somewhat
surprising, but not entirely unexpected. Results are surprising in the sense that an
individual’s degree o f investment within a particular organization was not related to, and
therefore did not affect, how participants evaluated a message in terms o f argument
focus. Likewise, central processing was unrelated to identity and greater degrees of
identity did not contribute to more out-group focused statements. These non-significant
findings are contrary to previous research and theory. For instance, it would be expected
that individuals who were considered out-group members would evoke more bias. In
turn, the nature of the elaborations would invoke peripheral processing representing an
evaluation of the message based on previously held beliefs about the out-group. Thus,
greater degrees of identity invested within a group would bias participants towards
negatively charged statements based on membership, and not necessarily the merits of
the argument presented. This theory has been previously supported by researchers of
identity and persuasion and cited as evidence o f peripheral processing (e.g., Flemming &
Petty, 2000; McGarty et al., 1994; Wilder, 1990).
Similarly, our inquiry into the elaboration focus of a message was based on
principals o f identity. In essence, we proposed an intermediate step involving the
evaluation of a threat message that defined the motivation to focus cognitive attention
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either within the participant’s own group, or towards the group that presented a hostile
message. Although our findings did generally support the validity o f elaboration focus
(see section below), we expected lower degrees of identity to promote a focus within the
participant’s group, whereas greater degrees of identity would promote elaborations
towards the out-group. These expectations were based on principals o f prototypicallity
(Branscombe et al., 1999; Spears et al., 1999), essentially demonstrating that high
identifiers tend towards greater degrees of bias, and therefore focus on the out-group who
presented a threat in order to devalue them.
Neither of the above explanations were the case in the current study. There are,
however, several methodological and theoretical explanations for why identity did not
predict or relate to central or peripheral statements or group focused statements. One
simple explanation is that our identity measure simply did not “capture” the other
necessary components o f identity that are associated with cognitive elaboration. Previous
studies have structured their designs around the creation o f in-groups and out-groups that
were experimentally pre-determined (e.g., Haslam et al., 1995) and have not actively
employed a measure o f identity to determine a subject’s individual importance o f group
membership.
One interesting possibility regarding this finding is that previous researchers
employing individual measures o f identity would discover similar findings if they
examined both individual and group level scores. This would imply that persuasive
evaluation of an in-group and out-group message is active on a group level, and not as a
function o f individual identity. Given theories o f prototypicallity, where individuals
within groups tend to conglomerate around typical group behavior (Branscombe et al.,
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1999; Oakes et al., 1991; Turner et al., 1987), this explanation is probable. As such,
persuasion and identity research might benefit from additional group and subject level
analyses examining identity at both levels.
Although identity did not relate to central and peripheral processing and group
focused elaborations, our combined HLM model placing these variables as predictors of
group-level positive and negative responses provides several interesting findings
regarding the evaluation of threat in an IRT setting. First, results demonstrated a
tendency (p < .10) for our inclusion salience manipulation to produce differential degrees
o f negative statements. Specifically, high inclusion statements tended to produce more
negative statements as opposed to low inclusion statements. This finding is not
surprising given the general relationship between in-group bias ratings and negative
statements produced (see Table 2). It seems reasonable to assume that a biased response
o f a speaker would be associated with negative statements regarding what that person had
to say about participants’ organizations.
With regards to identity as a predictor o f negative and positive statements,
results did not demonstrate an overall relationship between these two variables (unlike in
group bias), but did demonstrate a significant interaction with source of the message
towards predicting negative statements. An examination o f Figure 4 essentially shows a
similar outcome o f source and identity towards negative statements as with in-group bias.
Negative statements sharply increased for in-group presenters as individual levels of
identity increased, whereas negativity tended to slightly degrease as identity increased for
out-group members. Similar to our interpretation o f this effect with in-group bias, these
results are highly indicative of a black sheep effect (Hornsey & Imani, 2004) where
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participants felt more betrayed by in-group members presenting hostile messages if they
had greater amounts o f invested identity in the group. Conversely, out-group members
were expected to be negative, and as such negativity slightly decreased for participants
who reported greater amounts of identity. This decrease in negative statements can
possibly be attributed to an “expectation o f hostility” that would come from out-group
members. Normative fit will assist comparative fit towards increasing in-group bias (e.g.
Oakes et al., 1991), but rating the out-group as inferior does not necessarily imply a need
to respond in a manner that is consistently negative. One possibility is that participants
reported greater amounts o f identity, disdain over the message increased. As such, highly
identified participants essentially did not lower themselves to the out-groups levels. This
interpretation is speculative, but might be o f interest in future studies.
The examination of individual levels of central and peripheral processing towards
predicting negative and positive statements provides several additional findings to
examine. In support o f our hypotheses and IRT conditions of threat, our findings
demonstrate that greater amounts o f argument focused statements were associated with
less negativity. This finding highlights a general trend in early persuasion research
demonstrating less negative responses to positive arguments when central processing
occurs (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979; Petty et al., 1983). The general interpretation of these
findings suggests that the use o f central processing in an IRT condition is to alleviate
perceptions o f threat before negatively evaluating the merits of the argument itself.
However, the relationship between the degree of argument focused statements
and the valence of responses differed for both o f our salience manipulations of inclusion
and source. Specifically, low inclusion statements demonstrated a sharp decline in
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negative statements as argument focused statements increased, whereas high inclusion
statements were consistently negative regardless of the amount of argument focused
statements that ensue. This interaction o f argument focused statements and negative
responses across inclusion manipulations further validate our interpretation of mean
negativity statements for inclusion messages. In essence, low inclusion sources produced
less negative statements as argument focused elaboration ensued because the message
was considered less threatening to the group as a whole. Thus, careful consideration of
the message produced less valid threatening arguments by which all o f the members of a
group should be concerned about personally. In contrast, because the high inclusion
message threatens the entire group, negativity remains constant regardless o f the amount
o f argument focused elaboration that occurs. In essence, although the message was not
considered likely or typical of the group, participants felt obliged to return threat with
threat.
In a similar vein, results showed that the source of the message also significantly
affected the degree to which negative statements and argument focused statements related
to each other. Results demonstrated a significant interaction where in-group presenters
o f a threat message were rated consistently negatively despite the amount that individual
target group members focused on the content and validity of the argument. In contrast,
negativity sharply decreased as argument elaboration ensued for out-group presenters o f
a threat message. This interaction is strongly suggestive o f Petty et al.’s (1983)
credibility effect similar to our explanation of the interaction o f identity and source
towards predicting negative elaborations, and points to a distinct difference in how out
groups and in-groups are cognitively evaluated. Consider that an out-group source is
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considered less credible and believable by a target organization (McGarty et al., 1994;
Wilder, 1990). Thus, as the message is elaborated upon, negativity decreases because
within IRT conditions less validity in the message can be construed as less consequential
in terms of consequences (e.g., not a valid threat, and therefore, not worthy of disdain).
As a result, argument elaboration increases for messages presented by out-group
members, and less negative statements ensue because the content of the threat was taken
less seriously. In contrast, an in-group member would be considered more
knowledgeable and sympathetic to a group. As such, regardless o f the amount of
cognitive elaboration provided towards the message, negativity remained constant; the
consequence o f betrayal by another organization who holds a similar ideology (e.g.,
black sheep effect, Hornsey & Imani, 2004).
It is important to note that these findings are in stark contrast to early models of
peripheral and central processing (Cacioppo & Petty, 1979; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979)
where greater message elaboration would result in greater negativity if the message was
not of high caliber (e.g., weak statements and invalid logic, see Petty & Cacioppo, 1979).
These results also starkly contrast McGarty et al.’s (1994) findings where the out-group
was generally ignored in terms of message validity and content (but also see Mackie &
Worth, 1989; Mackie et al., 1990; Mackie et al., 1992). In situations similar to the
experimental paradigms explained above we would expect our findings to be the opposite
(i.e., out-groups are consistently negative regardless o f elaboration, whereas in-groups
show less negativity as central processing increases). However, we believe that the above
findings are a direct consequence of the IRT condition produced in these experimental
scenarios. As stated before, none o f the previous studies applied an analysis of
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persuasion to messages that had potential and immediate consequences to the well being
o f the group. Messages where final graduation exams may occur in several years (Van
Knippenberg et al., 1994) or road safety (McGarty et al., 1994) may represent beliefs
regarding group members about proper behavior, but do not represent immediate
consequences to the group’s good standing. Thus, in an immediately threatening setting,
results further support the superordinate role of threat with identity (Reynolds et al.,
2000). Threat overrides salient and relevant contrast because o f its immediate
importance and relevance to group standing (Turner et al., 1987). As such, a member of
similar ideology presenting a message purporting a change in a particular belief or
support for an upcoming event would likely be closely evaluated and more positive
statements presented dependent on the quality o f their presentation (i.e., mimicking
previous researchers’ findings). But, a message presenting inherent threat to a group
from a representative o f a similar organization represents betrayal and internal politics
within a larger body. Thus, IRT conditions provide evidence that message elaboration,
bias, and valence o f counterarguments do not follow previous research because threat
generally turns in-group members into potentially more threatening individuals than out
group members, who are not as knowledgeable about internal workings or are considered
less respectable because of previous expectations of hostile behavior.
Finally, with regards to group focused statements, a general relationship was
found between in-group focused elaborations and negative statements. As predicted in
response to a threat message, greater amounts of in-group focused statements were
significantly associated with lesser degrees o f negative statements. However, contrary to
our expectation, in-group focused statements did not differentially relate to negative
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statements as a function of our salience manipulations. This finding is somewhat
surprising. Our expectations o f in-group focused statements as a predictor o f negative
statements were based on concepts of identity and salient contrast. In essence, we
expected less degrees of salience to promote less contrast and bias between groups. As a
result, participants within groups would apply the threat message towards the recipients
of the threat and not the presenter of the threat. Instead, results suggest that groupfocused statements are not related to identity (at least not directly) and are not influenced
by differing degrees o f salience.
However, our results demonstrate a general principal of persuasion. Individuals
who focus on the presenter of a threat message are more inclined to present negative
statements as opposed to participants who evaluate their own group. Thus, a greater
degree o f negativity occurs as out-group focus occurs. Furthermore, in the scope o f ELM
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), the positive relationship between these two variables is not
surprising. Given the lack of effect our salience manipulations had on in-group focused
statements, one might consider this principal a pre-cursor to central and peripheral
processing. In essence, out-group focused statements are associated with peripheral
processing, as would be expected given salient contrast regarding the “different” qualities
of the out-group (Turner et al., 1987). Conversely, argument focused statements represent
a greater amount o f processing o f the message, which is facilitated by applying the merits
of the message to other group members to test its typicality in context o f group
membership.
These findings regarding in-group focused statements can also be interpreted
more specifically as a potential inhibitor o f normative fit (Oakes et al., 1991) that occurs
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on an individual to individual basis within groups. Participants who are more inclined to
examine the merits of an argument by applying them to themselves and other members
are less likely to actively contrast themselves against the out-group. As a consequence,
negativity regarding the out-group is less. This possibility, however, is very tentative, as
principals of SCT (Turner et al., 1987) tend to function around group-level manipulations
o f salient contrast. These researchers would not necessarily concur with the above
interpretation because it would suggest a random degree o f normative interference based
on other factors besides identity (which was unrelated to this measure). A potential
variable that could validate this interpretation might be need for cognition (NFC)
Cacioppo, Petty & Morris, 1983), where greater degrees of NFC contribute to in-group
focused evaluation, and in turn reduce bias. In all, further examination of in-group
focused statements and bias within laboratory conditions could potentially tease out this
possibility, or provide direction as to which other potential variables might validate or
invalidate this possibility.
Regardless of the mechanisms that support a relationship between in-group
focused elaboration and negative statements, this finding has practical applicability. The
current research suggests that statements incorporated within a message that focus
participants to evaluate the merits of a threat or negative message in context of
themselves and other group members could result in less negativity. As a consequence,
when presented with a hostile message, participants may evoke less bias if statements are
designed to promote in-group elaboration. Future research may wish to address this
possibility by including group focus statements in IRT and laboratory scenarios to
determine if this is a consistent effect or unique to IRT conditions.
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In summation, our examination of persuasion has provided several interesting
findings regarding IRT scenarios. In terms of practical applications, presenters of critical
messages should be aware of black sheep effects (Hornsey & Imani, 2004) in the sense
that in-groups are not evaluated as well in terms o f criticism compared to out-groups,
who generate less negativity as participants engage in central processing. Likewise,
presenter criticisms benefit from central processing more so when the message applies
only to a few members. Finally, the more that a speaker can present a message in such a
way that focuses participants to elaborate on the message in context o f their personal and
group behavior, the more likely responses will be positive.
Discussion: Belief Perseverance Identity and Salience
Our examination into the perseverance of belief in terms o f bias and belief in the
participant’s “goodness” of a group demonstrated some interesting findings. Although
we expected that bias would persist while decreases in value would not, results
demonstrated that bias was significantly reduced for the entire sample, whereas the
perception o f a group’s value persisted as if the threat message presented was veridical.
However, our exploratory examination o f residual bias using HLM demonstrates that
there are exceptions to this finding.
Once residual bias was examined in terms of the differing salience manipulations
that we provided to participants, results demonstrated that bias was reduced from
participants’ initial ratings of the message, but initial differences that occurred from
differing degrees o f inclusion tended (p < .10) to persist. In essence, groups that received
a low inclusion threat tended to display more residual bias than those groups who
received a high inclusion message, similar to our examination of initial bias.
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These results are interesting, and to our knowledge, the first o f their kind, in that
they demonstrate that the initial stimulus perceived by participants dictates their
evaluation of that stimulus when the stimulus in question is negated. In more applicable
terms, a bias threat induced by a low inclusion message in contrast to a high inclusion
message continues to differentially persist. Thus, one piece o f information provided by
this research is that the degree to which a message is hostile or threatening is going to
determine how much bias persists even when the message is proved to be fatuous. This
is in contrast to what might be expected, in that participants would re-evaluate new
information regarding the fact that the information was true, and in turn re-evaluate their
beliefs about the person who presented the message to a generally neutral stance. Instead,
these differences did not “wash out” given the new information, but instead bias was
reduced in proportion to the initial bias created.
This “differential persistence o f bias” becomes somewhat more complicated by
a significant relationship between identity and residual bias. Across the groups who
participated, those individuals who had lower degrees of identity invested in a particular
group reported less overall residual bias in contrast to those who were highly invested in
a group. However, identity did not demonstrate differential relationships (e.g., predictive
slopes) between inclusion or source manipulations for residual bias, indicating a general
relationship across conditions. Although the relationship between identity and bias
persistence has not been specifically studied, many other studies within and outside of
social identity research can corroborate and explain this finding. Anderson (1995a)
demonstrated that previously held implicit personality theories tend to bias subsequent
judgments. Similarly, the current research demonstrates that previously held beliefs about
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belonging to and being similar to others in a group will also affect the extent to which an
individual is willing to “let go” of a message that threatens their beliefs about that group.
In context o f research by Branscombe et al. (1999), low identifiers are willing to re
evaluate their beliefs (e.g., Anderson & Lindsey, 1998) about the group that threatened
them as their initial attachment to the group is low, and it does not personally benefit
them to continue to believe in the negativity attributed to the group. Conversely, high
identifiers may realize that the threat in question is not valid, but continue to display
some bias simply because much o f their sense of self-esteem and identity is embedded
within a particular group.
The above results demonstrate that both initial levels of bias created by a stimulus
as well as the degree o f identity invested by participants towards a target group, does
alter the degree to which bias will persist when attempts are made to negate it. However,
the examination of changes in their perception o f group value using HLM did not return
any significant findings due to identity or salience manipulations. Thus, unlike bias
whose findings are qualified by identity and salience manipulations, the overall global
test of value described earlier seems consistent regardless of identity. That is, the
significant reduction in participants’ perceptions o f their group as a “good group”
persisted regardless o f factual information invalidating the threat.
The persistence of residual value is somewhat perplexing, and contrary to our
hypotheses that in some cases value ratings might increase due to threat (e.g. Batson,
1975). However, this finding is consistent to other general studies involving belief
perseverance (e.g., Anderson, Lepper, & Ross, 1980; Anderson & Sechler, 1986;
Jennings, Lepper, & Ross, 1981; Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975), in the sense that
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initial information provided to participants will tend to persist, despite invalidating
information. What is somewhat disturbing about the current finding is that perceptions of
value regarding a group that is personally relevant and meaningful to individual
participants is susceptible to belief persistence. The negative evaluations of a group from
which participants derive meaning would in theory be less susceptible to negative
evaluations because of a group’s importance to identity and self-esteem. Moreover, the
current scenario differs substantially from other belief perseverance scenarios in that the
target o f the presented information is pre-established and directly relevant to the
participant. Although other studies have reinforced beliefs by providing praise at
participants’ accuracy in judging suicide notes (Ross Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975), it stands
to reason that temporary praise regarding a behavior that was rarely if ever performed by
participants does not equate to a threat message regarding a group to which an individual
belongs. Rather, we would expect that the personal relevance o f the group in question
would provide substantially more motivation to examine the new information provided
by dispelling the threat message (e.g., Anderson & Lindsey, 1998). Thus, a negation in
the reduction o f perceived value of the group would occur. However, it appears that
belief persistence is “persistent” regardless o f the personal relevance or meaning of the
target o f a message, emphasizing the power of this psychological phenomenon.
Given the attempt to examine threat within an IRT setting, several practical and
tentative applications can be made from this study. With regards to belief perseverance,
our results suggest that a threat that produces less initial bias is apt to be “forgiven” once
the information in question is repudiated. Practically speaking, individuals or groups
accusing other groups o f minor infractions will not be held as accountable if proven false
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as compared to grander more inclusive threat producing accusations. Similarly, this
research suggests that non “core believers” (e.g., low identifiers) are more apt to
disregard their negative feelings towards others who try to accuse their group of wrong
doing. The current research demonstrates that when a group in question is accused, those
who highly identify with it will continue to resent the accuser, even when exonerated
from wrong doing.
Finally, the continuation in participants’ beliefs that their group was “less good”
despite discrediting information supports the age old adage of “do not bear false
witness”. In essence, these results show consequences in how participants view their
organization when false accusations are presented. However, it is important to state that
this reduction in value may not persist over time, but rather represents an immediate
reevaluation o f information before provided with additional information regarding the
falsehood o f the information. Future research may want to examine whether participants’
views remain more negative of their organization longitudinally, provided this research
can be conducted without harming participants.
Strengths and Limitations
The above analyses demonstrated both consistent and readily interpretable
findings in the context o f Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory (Tajfel
& Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987). However, the reader is cautioned towards the
interpretation of these findings in several ways.
First, although analyses were conducted within manipulations to examine
potential differences due to group type, group membership was not able to be fully
crossed within the HLM model. As such, our findings provide initial and suggestive
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evidence that group ideology does not consistently or systematically influence bias,
persuasion, or belief perseverance within the context of pre-existing groups. However,
analyses did not control for these differences simply because they were not
systematically occurring, or frequent enough to allow insertion (and thereby controlled
analysis demonstrating the individual effect of group ideology) into the HLM model.
Thus, the current study cannot rule out the possibility that future studies that are able to
collect a larger, fully crossed sample, may find a small, but significant effect o f group
ideology across college organizations. It is also possible that a systematic examination of
these variables and group ideology within a laboratory context, without the other
environmental factors inherent in this study may also demonstrate this finding.
Second, and in a similar vein, our analyses of gender should be interpreted with
caution. Results in the current manuscript do not suggest that gender of our confederate
significantly altered our results, and a case could be made that our significant findings
were over and above what seemed to be a positive evaluation o f males towards female
confederates; however, these findings do not rule out the possibility that gender bias does
contribute to in-group bias, particularly if the norms inherent in a group revolve around
beliefs involving gender. This study did not specifically test organizations involved with
gender equality, nor did any participants come from anti-equality groups regarding
gender. Future research may demonstrate independent gender-bias outside of traditional
in-group bias, when the target group in question involves gender specific beliefs.
It is also relevant to note that conclusive tests for actor performance, or
differences in the dependent variables due to differing colleges or regions, could not be
satisfactorily conducted. The scarcity o f groups willing to participate, in conjunction
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with the need to recruit from multiple campuses and the use of different actors, severely
limits reliable conclusions from partial analyses. As a result, it is possible that mean
differences are potentially confounded by regional or actor differences. However, as
predictor variables were group mean centered, Level 1 predictor variables are immune to
this possibility. Future research should replicate this study and its findings within one
particular location, ruling out this unlikely, but potential possibility.
The above advisories having been stated, the overall results o f these HLM
models, although placed on a small sample size, seem consistent, and moderately reliable
in terms o f findings. Results overall do not produce any findings that are un-interpretable
by current social identity theory. However, this study was specifically designed both as a
study examining conflict in realistic scenarios, and as a preliminary study from which
general and applicable findings can be more rigorously examined. As such, results should
be considered generally applicable. The above having been said, these findings are
substantial enough and powerful enough given a smaller sample size to suggest that the
majority of these results should replicate in future studies. Other studies could replicate
these findings by letting group membership randomly vary across participants in a
laboratory setting. However, laboratory studies would only be relevant if a method could
be devised to present threatening, and possibly positive messages that are generic enough
to be meaningful by a large variety o f campus organizations.
Future Research
Additional studies in traditional and non-traditional venues would provide
additional evidence to support these environmentally relevant findings. One o f the
weaknesses of the current study involves the use o f group level analyses. Although the
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use of HLM allows for subject level analyses and intra-class correlations between
subjects within groups, individual level studies should be conducted. To that extent
future research should use the world-wide-web as a potential medium for follow up
studies. A wide variety o f participants could be presented one o f several pre-prepared
positive and negative evaluations of groups, organizations, and ideologies, based on selfidentifying information provided in a preliminary survey. With some forethought, a large
sample of participants could be assessed on positive and negative assessments o f groups
or organizations from which they personally derive identity.
In addition, the above design would allow for a greater amount of differing
ideological groups, which could be precisely analyzed in subject level OLS designs,
further testing our preliminary findings regarding differences in bias due to group
ideology. With a large enough sample size across many different ideologies, small
differences in bias or persuasion could be detected within individual ideologies.
Likewise, the further addition of inclusion and source manipulations could be examined
within positive and negative contexts providing more insight regarding threat persuasion
and conflict.
Subsequent studies using a similar internet format could make use o f our basic
findings regarding in-group focused elaborations. The addition o f a manipulation
variable either encouraging or discouraging in-group elaboration would represent a
second important test o f salience and bias reduction due to in-group focused elaboration.
Differences in bias and elaboration due to participants’ focus on the validity o f the threat
for their own group compared to applying their cognitive efforts towards repudiating the
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out-group, would support a practical application of group-focused elaborations towards
reducing conflict in difficult situations.
Should subsequent studies replicate a general lack of differences in bias across
differing ideologies, the implications would warrant a study that investigates a potentially
subject level variation in the need to belong and identify oneself to ideologies regardless
o f the particular ideology to which one adheres. The essence o f this research would
attempt to find commonalities between highly identified participants across groups in the
hopes of finding similar needs and desires to clearly identify “me and not me” via the use
o f organization or ideology membership. Successful findings along these lines would
support a conclusion that with regards to negative reactions, membership is important,
but ideology is ultimately irrelevant.
Conclusion
In an attempt to examine SCT and SIT within realistic and threat settings, the
current research provides initial evidence that bias, persuasion, and belief perseverance
function within the context o f previously established social identity and self
categorization theory premises (Tajfel et al., 1971; Turner et al., 1987). What is
important about the current research is that although results are explainable in terms of
the above theories, IRT conditions do not directly correspond to other studies that either
did not explore more specific pre-existing ideologies or did not induce direct threat. We
believe that the current research provides several additional and exciting avenues of
research to follow regarding identity and threat in realistic conditions and has generally
demonstrated immediately practical and generalizable findings for individuals who
regularly deal with conflict in real-word settings. Similarly, the current study has
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demonstrated two new potential variables that contribute to bias and salience, namely,
speaker induced inclusion and group-focused elaborations, that future studies may find
valuable towards predicting, and perhaps mediating bias.
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REFERENCE NOTES

1 The use of the term “persuasion” in this particular research context should be
interpreted judiciously. Persuasion researchers (e.g. Petty & Cacioppo, 1979, McGarty et
al., 1994) have previously examined attitude change in the context of positive or negative
reactions to a particular message, positive or negative responses, or individual evaluative
processes (e.g. central or peripheral processing). However, these kinds o f evaluations do
not assess long term attitude change. Rather, in the current context, persuasion represents
an initial evaluative positive or negative response to a particular message.

2 Belief Perseverance can also be operationally defined as belief persistence. For
the sake of the current research belief perseverance is defined as participant’s tendency to
maintain a lessened belief about the goodness of their group, despite clear instructions
that indicate that the threat message is fictitious.
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APPENDIX A

INTERPRETING HLM

HLM functions very much like multiple regression, with the exception that the
data is modeled on subject and group level responses. In the current study, HLM is used
to conduct both an ANOVA style analysis of mean differences, as well as more
traditional regression-like prediction analyses. At Level 1 predictors are placed towards
predicting the dependent variable. Nominal group-level manipulations are placed at Level
2.

HLM reports a gamma score, the standard error of the mean, a t coefficient, and
probability. The principal effect coefficient is represented by y. Gamma represents the
un-standardized effect of the variable on the dependent variable. As with multiple
regression, the gamma score is similar to B in a multiple regression. Gamma represents
the amount of change in independent variable in context of one unit change in the
dependent variable. In any HLM output the gamma divided by the standard error of the
mean will reproduce the t-score, which is used to determine significant variation. As a
result, if gamma is large and the S.E. is small, a significant result is likely.
Regarding the current use of HLM, please refer to Table 3, which represents an
analysis of in-group bias. At Level 1 individual’s identity scores are placed as a predictor
of in-group bias. At Level 2 Inclusion (high, low) and Source (in-group, out-group) are
coded as dummy variables.
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Level 2 results are represented as INTERCPT, INCLUSION, and SOURCE. These
variables are denoted as yOO - y02 . Because these terms are dummy coded, Level 2
analyses represent a test of mean differences due to the manipulation on the dependent
variable. These scores can be interpreted exactly the same as conducting an ANOVA
using multiple regression. As such, a significant intercept represents a model that
predicts significantly better than the mean of the dependent variable. Likewise, a
significant gamma for either inclusion or source represents a significant mean difference
in the D.V. due to the manipulation.
Level 1 HLM outputs are also presented with INERCPT, INCLUSION and SOURCE
terms, but are interpreted differently because the predictor is a continuous variable. For
Level 1 predictors a significant intercept represents an overall across group significant
relationship between the predictor (in this example, identity) and the dependent variable
(in this case, in-group bias). The INCLUSION and SOURCE variables at Level 1
represent a test of an interaction of identity with either of the Level 2 variables of
inclusion and source. A significant gamma for either of these variables can be interpreted
the exact same way as a nominal/ordinal interaction term placed in multiple regression. In
other words, a significant interaction of a Level 1 continuous variable and a Level 2
nominal variable represents a significantly different association (e.g. slope) between
identity and bias within each condition. As an example, a significant gamma for the Level
1 INCLUSION term would indicate that the slope of identity and bias in the low
inclusion conditions are significantly different from the high inclusion conditions. In
these cases, Figures are presented to examine the practical interpretation of the
interaction.
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APPENDIX B

PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS AND CONSENT

Hello, you are probably wondering why I am here. My name is Brian Laythe and I am a
doctoral student of psychology. I am conducting an experiment on a technique for group
communication sponsored by the psychology department with cooperation from xxx.
Another student organization has requested to speak with you and has agreed to let us try
our new technique with you all. This is (xxxx), their representative. Although I am sure
other representatives from student groups have spoken with you before, this
communication technique is experimental, and in order to participate you have to fill out
a consent form. Please read and sign these forms. After you complete a consent form,
we will give you more information about our speaker and this process. After we have
given you this information we will give you a second opportunity to not participate in this
communication process.
(AFTER COLLECTION OF CONSENT FORMS)
Thank you for deciding to participate. Our new communication technique is a new way
to promote effective and uninhibited communication of thoughts and feelings between
groups when complaints have been made against a student organization. This is why I
am here.
MANIPULATION A. (IDENTIFICATION A S OUT-GROUP)
Members o f another student organization that have very different eoals and ideals
than (enter group name here) have made complaints about this group.
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MANIPULATIONB. (IDENTIFICATIONAS IN-GROUP)
Members o f another student organization that have very similar soals and ideals like
(enter group name here) have made complaints about this group.
(xxxx), as the representative of this group will present their feelings and concerns to
you in a brief statement within the context of a experimental procedure. Your
anonymous individual responses will be typed and sent back to the organization that
will speak to you shortly.
Our process focuses on both groups having the freedom to express their opinions
without worry of specific affiliation or peer-pressure. This is why I have not
identified (xxxx) group affiliation. If you recognize the representative speaker’s
group affiliation, please keep it to yourself until the end of the experiment.
We provide you questionnaires to give you the opportunity to voice their own opinions
and feelings and state what you really feel and think without worrying about your peer’s
opinions.
HOPEFULLY, THIS WILL CREATE A PRESSURE FREE ENVIRONMENT FOR
EVERYONE TO EXPRESS THEMSELVES.
PROCEDURE:
There is a specific structure to this program because we are interested in the effectiveness
of this technique as a mediation tool for situations involving complaints. In a moment,
we will provide a packet that contains 3 parts (Sections A, B, and C). Each section asks
you to answer various scale items, but also provides you an opportunity to write your
comments and opinions down. HOWEVER, PLEASE DO NOT TURN TO ANY
SECTION UNTIL WE ASK YOU TO.
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You will notice that there are no identifying marks on these packets other than an I.D.
number and section identification. This is to ensure your individual privacy.
Before the representative speaks, we will ask you to fill out the first section (Labeled
section A). This packet allows us to assess your relationship with this student
organization.
After you all complete section A, the representative will speak to you. After the
representative has finished speaking please use the second packet (Labeled section B).
Section B is designed so that you answer several important questions about the
representative but also allows you to voice any concerns that you may have.
As part o f our experimental procedure, we insist that you do not ask questions during this
part o f the program, but answer the questions and write your comments within the
section B packet.
When everyone’s Section B packet is finished, we will make some brief comments and
then ask you to complete a very brief third part of the packet (labeled Section C).
After completion of all three sections, we will reveal (xxxx) affiliation and have a
structured discussion about group concerns.
Now that you have full information about this procedure, we would like to repeat
that this procedure is voluntary. If anyone has now chosen not to participate we
would ask them to please leave the room.
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2. Manipulation Statements
STATEMENT AGAINST THE ENTIRE ORGANIZATION
Thank you for letting me speak as a representative of concerned people in our group.
IF PRESENTED AS AN IN-GROUP MEMBER:
I would like to say first of all that I am a (xxxx) like the rest of you.
However,
IF PRESENTED AS AN OUT-GROUP MEMBER:
I’ll be to the point about this
We have some problems with (your groups) behavior at XXX. Several of us have
watched you give some pretty serious attitude to people you talk to, like the {insert
group) is some “special group of people”. Many people in our group have suggested
(your) actions to mean that you think you are better than everybody else, and I tend to
agree with them.
On several occasions, members of my group told me that {You all) have acted like the
{insert group) has the right to shove your group down everyone else’s throats. People in
my group have told me that they can’t get a word in because {everyone in the xxxx) are
too busy acting offended and telling everybody how things should be. Then {all o f you)
go off about how you don’t do this sort of thing or how that’s the wrong way to do this or
that.
We think that you need to be aware of your own actions with other people on campus.
It wouldn’t hurt {all o f you) to listen a little more and respect others around you. Other
people different from you might deserve respect too. Just because people may not be
from (the xxxx) does not mean that they do not have important or helpful things to say.
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STATEMENT AGAINST A FEW INDIVIDUALS WITHIN THE ORGANIZATION
Thank you for letting me speak as a representative of concerned people in our group.
IF PRESENTED AS AN IN-GROUP MEMBER:
I would like to say first of all that I am a (xxxx) like the rest of you.
However,
IF PRESENTED AS AN OUT-GROUP MEMBER:
I’ll be to the point about this
We have some problems with (a few of your members) behavior at XXX. Several of
us have watched (members of your group) give some pretty serious attitude to people you
talk to, like the (insert group) is some “special group of people”. Many people in our
group have suggested (these members) actions to mean that you think you are better than
everybody else, and I tend to agree with them.
On several occasions, members of my group told me that {these members) have acted
like the (insert group) has the right to shove your group down everyone else’s throats.
People in my group have told me that they can’t get a word in because {some members o f
xxxx) are too busy acting offended and telling everybody how things should he. Then
{these people) go off about how you don’t do this sort of thing or how that’s the wrong
way to do this or that.
We think that you need to be aware of your own actions with other people on campus.
It wouldn’t hurt {these members o f xxxx) to listen a little more and respect others around
you. Other people different from you might deserve respect too. Just because people
may not be from (the xxxx) does not mean that they do not have important or helpful
things to say.
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3. Pseudo Debriefing Statement
Thank you for listening and participating in our attempts to further communication
between social groups. However, I wish to tell you now that you have been deceived.
Our speaker in fact does not represent another social group. The statements that you just
heard accusing your group were fictitious. We are not aware of any group that has
concerns of issues with your behavior. The statements that you just heard have no basis
in reality. In fact we made them up. Our representative and ourselves have no quarrels
with your behavior, and do not endorse any of the views that you previously heard.
Although we admit that we have deceived you, we now ask that you indulge us for five
more minutes. We have a very small final assessment sheet that we would like you to fill
out. We ask you to answer these questions within the context of the information that we
have just provided you. Part of the reason we ask you to do this, is to ensure that you
have heard us correctly and understand that these statements were not based in fact. Let
me make this clear: the group the speaker represented is fictitious. As soon as you are
finished with this quick assessment we will provide an extended explanation as to why
we have deceived you, our motivation behind it, and how this experience can be valuable
for you as a group and personally.

Again, we thank you for your indulgence.
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4. Final Debriefing Statement
I would like to thank you again for participating and explain why we have deceived you.
My name IS Brian Laythe, but I am not examining a new communication technique. You
have just completed an experiment that examines group identity and conflict. I am a
psychology graduate student and these are my research assistants (provide research
assistant names here). We apologize for deceiving you, but I am examining how social
groups respond to threatening information, and the only way we could get an honest
response is by creating a story to justify giving you these surveys. We realize that you
may be upset and we want to let you voice any concerns that you have. We do not want
anyone to leave here feeling badly.
We have performed this experiment because we are trying to understand specific
factors that contribute to conflict. Several events across university campuses make an
empirical examination of conflict worthwhile, even if we deceived you temporarily. For
instance, campus riots have occurred at Indiana University Bloomington, and the
University of New Hampshire. In addition, frequent and often intense debates occur
between student organizations across university campuses. Your participation in this
experiment may help to alleviate conflicts across campus by providing us a better
understanding of the nature of group conflict. We hope that you feel that our deception
was justified.
There are a few things that I want you to know up-front:
1.

You were not specifically picked for this experiment for any reason
other than the fact that your group represents a body of individuals who
share similar goals and ideals.

150

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

2.

I am currently in the process of performing this experiment with many
other groups some of which are similar to yours and some of which are
not.

In essence, I promise that I am not picking on you, and that other groups be they
religious, political, or in the Greek system, have been or will be participating in this
experiment.
Your group participated in one of four conditions that we believe either exacerbate or
minimize feelings of bias or conflict between groups (state condition here). One of our
goals is to compare these conflict conditions across various groups with differing
ideologies to see what differences exist, and attempt to determine if specific ideologies in
themselves promote or hinder conflict.
The surveys that you completed essentially addressed three large areas that may help
us understand conflict between groups. The first of these addressed any feelings of
conflict or bias from being confronted with a negative message. Our other two areas
concerned:
1. How you processed the message by examining your written responses.
2. How your feelings towards the speaker and feelings about your group changed
when we informed you that the statement was fictitious.
The culmination of this data that you have helped us collect could prove to be
invaluable in minimizing conflict between groups. For instance, we may discover that
certain conflict situations always produce bias, and an inability to process a valid
complaint message. We may also discover that if someone has been falsely accused that
further steps have to be taken for people to believe in their innocence. More importantly,
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these studies can tell us what ways complaints between groups should not be handled,
information that we feel the IUS community will find valuable. For instance, if
something is important to your group, wouldn’t you like to know the best way of
approaching another group to ensure that you get what you need? If the group that you
are approaching has different goals than yours, then the information we collected today
would be useful to you.
Finally, because we feel that this research is important and useful to many groups, we
would like to ask a favor of you. Although we have deceived you, it is of crucial
importance that other groups not know about what we are doing in order for us to
continue this research. Thus, we ask you to help us one last time by serving as
confederates of our experiment. Please do not discuss this experiment with other groups
or people that you know.
That is all we have to say, unless there are any other concerns. PLEASE FEEL FREE
TO ASK ME ANY QUESTIONS THAT YOU WISH OR DISCUSS ANY NEGATIVE
FEELINGS THAT YOU STILL HAVE. We again want to emphasize that we do not
want anyone to leave here upset or disturbed. As you leave please take a debriefing sheet
that has my number xxx-xxx-xxxx and my advisor, Dr. xxxxxxx number, xxx-xxx-xxxx.
If you have any additional concerns or upset from this experiment please do not hesitate
to call us. Finally, if you have any questions or concerns about your rights as a
participant, please contact xxx-xxxx, at the Office of Academic Affairs, xxx-xxx-xxxx.

152

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

APPENDIX C

APPARATUS

COMMUNICATION ASSESSMENT
PART A
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Thank you for participating in our discussion. The
following questionnaire will ask you
7. How often do you attend meetings of
questions about your affiliation with
this organization?
this organization. Because some of these
a. Never
_____
questions are personal, we would like to
assure you that your confidentiality is
b. Rarely
_____
c. Sometimes
_____
guaranteed. Please be as honest as
d. Frequently
_____
possible. Below you are some questions
that ask about general information on
e. I attend all meetings _____
your background group affiliation.

1. What sex are you?
a. Male
_____
b. Female
_____
c. Transgender _____

8. Do you belong to any other campus
organizations?

2. What is your age?_____

9. If so, please tell us how many other
campus organizations that you belong to.

YES

NO

3.What is your year in school?
a. Freshman
_____
b. Sophomore
_____
c. Junior
_____
d. Senior______ _____
e. Other
4. What is your marital status?
a. Married
b. Living with romantic partner
c. Single, never married
d. Single, divorced.

_
_
_
_

5. What is your sexual orientation?
a. Heterosexual
_____
b. Bisexual
_____
c. Homosexual
___
6. Race: ( please circle)
a. African American.
b. Asian American
c. Caucasian
d. Hispanic American.
e. Native American,
d. Other
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Please rate the following statements below with the following rating scale.
1 = strongly disagree 2 = disagree 3 = disagree somewhat
somewhat
6 = agree 7 = strongly agree
1 .1

4 = neutral 5 = agree

______

am a worthy member of this group.

2 .1 often feel I’m a useless member of this group.

______

3 .1 feel good about this group.

______

4. In general, others think that the group I belong to is unworthy.

______

5. In general, belonging to this group is an important part of my self-image.

______

6

. 1 feel I don’t have much to offer this group.

7. In general I’m glad to be a member of this group.

______
______

8 . Most people consider my group, on the average, to be more ineffective than other
social groups.
______

9. This group is an important reflection of who I am.
1 0 .1

______

am a cooperative participant of this group.________________________ ______

11. Overall, I often feel that the group of which I am a member is not worthwhile.

12. In general, others respect the group I belong to._____________________ ______
13. This group is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am.

______

14.1 often regret that I belong to this group.___________________________ ______
15. Overall, my group is considered good by others.____________________ ______
16. Overall, my membership in this group has very little to do with how I feel about
myself.
______
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Please take a moment to look at the person who is about to speak to you. Please rate
your assessment of him or her on the following items below.
-5

A

-3

-2

0

2

3

4

5

6
superior

-5

A

-3

-2

0

2

3

4

5

6
creative

-5

-4

-3

-2

0

2

3

4

5

6
helpful

-5

A

-3

-2

0

2

3

4

5

6
friendly

-6
-5
uncooperative

A

-3

-2

2

3

4

5

-6 -5
ignorant

A

-5
close-minded

-4

-5

-4

-6

inferior
-6

uncreative
-6

unhelpful
-6

unfriendly

-6

-6

6

cooperative
-3

-2

2

0

3

4

5

6

knowledgeable
-3

-2

2

0

3

4

5

6

open-minded
-3

-2

2

0

3

4

5

6

unjust

ju st

-6
-5
incorrect views

-4

-3

-2

2

0

3

4

5

6

correct views

How much would you say that your own personal beliefs and actions are typical
of your group’s beliefs and actions?
1 2
3
not at all typical

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11 12 13
completely typical

Would you say that other members of this group behave in such a way that
promotes the “positive image” of your group?
1
not at all

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12
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13
completely

Please rate your own group on the following i ems below.
_6
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superior
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2
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5

6

correct views

When I think about it, I am similar to the average member of this group
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 11 12 13
not at all
very much
When I think about it, I am similar to the person who is the representative speaker
for this presentation
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 11 12 13
not at all
very much
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COMMUNICATION ASSESSMENT AND GROUP RESPONSE
PARTB
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1. How important are the issues presented by the speaker to you?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
not at all
important

12 13
extremely
important

2. To what extent do you agree with the content of this message?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
do not at all
agree

12 13
completely
agree

3. To what extent do you agree that action should be taken about the issues just
presented?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12 13
no
a lot o f
action taken
action taken
4. To what extent does this person’s statement emotionally upset you?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12 13
not at all
extremely
emotionally upset
emotionally upset
5. To what extent does this person’s statement anger you?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
not at all
angry

11

12 13
extremely
angry

6. To what extent do you feel that the speaker’s statements accurately reflect your
group’s behavior?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12 13
not at all
completely
7. To what extent do you think that the speaker’s statements apply to everyone in
your group?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12 13
applies to
applies to
very few in the group
everyone in group
8. When I think about it, I am similar to the average member of this group
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12 13
not a t a ll

very much

9. How much would you say that your own personal beliefs and actions are typical
of your group’s beliefs and actions?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12 13
not at all typical
completely typical
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10. Would you say that other members of this group behave in such a way that
promotes the “positive image” of your group?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11 12 13
not at all
completely
11. To what extent did you like the messages just presented?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
didn’t like

11

12

13
really liked

12. To what extent do you feel that the arguments just presented were convincing?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11 12 13
not at all
extremely
convincing
convincing
13. Would you judge the reasons given for the speaker’s argument to be
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11 12 13
poor quality
very good quality
and uncompelling
and compelling
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Please rate the speaker that you just heard on the items below.
-5

-4

-3

-2

0

2

3

4

5

6
superior

-5

-4

-3

-2

0

2

3

4

5

6
creative

-5

-4

-3

-2

2

3

4

5

6
helpful

-5

-4

-3

-2

0

2

3

4

5

6
friendly

-6
-5
uncooperative

-4

-3

-2

0

2

3

4

5

-5

-4

_6

inferior
-6

uncreative
-6

unhelpful
-6

unfriendly

.6

cooperative
-3

-2

2

3

4

5

ignorant

6

knowledgeable

-6
-5
close-minded

-6

6

-5

-4

-3

-2

2

3

4

5

6

open-minded
-4

-3

-2

2

3

4

5

6

unjust

ju st

-5
incorrect views
.6

-4

-3

-2

2

0

3

4

5

6

correct views
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Please list any and all comments or thoughts that you had while listening to the speakers
statements. Please feel free to include any comments about anything related to what the
speaker said in the speech, the speaker and the speaker’s personality, the topic of the
speech, the context in which the speaker spoke, or anything else you might have been
thinking about during message presentation, including totally unrelated things.
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POST ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNICATION
PART C
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1. How important are the issues presented by the speaker to you?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 11
not at all
important

12 13
extremely
important

2. To what extent do you agree with the content of this message?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 11
do not at all
agree

12 13
completely
agree

3. To what extent do you agree that action should be taken about the issues just
presented?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 11
12 13
no
a lot o f
action taken
action taken
4. To what extent does this person’s statement emotionally upset you?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 11
12 13
not at all
extremely
emotionally upset
emotionally upset
5. To what extent does this person’s statement anger you?
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
not at all
angry

11

12 13
extremely
angry

6. To what extent do you feel that the speaker’s statements accurately reflect your
group’s behavior?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 11
12 13
not at all
completely
7. To what extent do you think that the speaker’s statements apply to everyone in
your group?
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 11
12 13
applies to
applies to
veryfew in the group
everyone in group
8. When I think about it, I am similar to the average member of this group
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 11
12 13
not at all
very much
9. How much would you say that your own personal beliefs and actions are typical
of your group’s beliefs and actions?
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 11
12 13
not at all typical
completely typical
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10. Would you say that other members of this group behave in such a way that
promotes the “positive image” of your group?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11 12 13
not at all
completely
11. To what extent did you like the messages just presented?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
didn’t like

11

12

13
really liked

12. To what extent do you feel that the arguments just presented were convincing?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11 12 13
not at all
extremely
convincing
convincing
13. Would you judge the reasons given for the speaker’s argument to be
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11 12 13
poor quality
very good quality
and uncompelling
and compelling
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Please rate the speaker that you just heard on the items below.
-6

-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

2

3

4

5

6

inferior
_6

superior
-5

-4

-3

-2

0

2

3

4

5

6

uncreative

creative
-5

-4

-3

-2

0

3

4

5

6
helpful

-5

-4

-3

-2

0

3

4

5

6
friendly

-6 -5
uncooperative

-4

-3

-2

0

3

4

5

-5

-4

-6

unhelpful
-6

unfriendly

-6

2

cooperative
-3

-2

2

0

3

4

5

ignorant

6

knowledgeable

-5
close-minded

-4

-5

-4

-6

_6

6

-3

-2

2

3

4

5

6

open-minded
-3

-2

2

0

3

4

5

6

unjust
-6
-5
incorrect views

ju st
-4

-3

-2

2

3

4

5

6

correct views

Finally, before participating, were you made aware of the nature of this program by
another person?
Yes
No
Before we told you that the representative presented fictitious information, did you
believe that his/her statement came from another student organization?
Yes
No

166

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

APPENDIX D

IRB APPROVAL FORMS
r

U n iv e r sity o f n e w

H a m p sh ire

N ovem ber 17, 2003
L a y t h e , B ria n
P s y c h o lo g y , C o n a n t H all

IRB # :
S tu dy:
A p proval D a te:

3034
T h e C r e a t i o n a n d P e r s e v e r a n c e o f B ia s a n d C o g n i t i v e R e s p o n s e t o T h r e a t w ith i n
P r e - e x i s t i n g S o c ia l G r o u p s : A S o c i a l - I d e n t i t y P e r s p e c t i v e
1 1 /1 4 /2 0 0 3

T h e I n s t i t u t i o n a l R e v i e w B o a r d f o r t h e P r o t e c t i o n o f H u m a n S u b j e c t s in R e s e a r c h ( I R B ) h a s
r e v i e w e d a n d a p p r o v e d t h e p r o t o c o l f o r y o u r s t u d y a s E x p e d i t e d a s d e s c r i b e d in T i t l e 4 5 , C o d e o f
F e d e r a l R e g u l a t i o n s (C F R ), P a r t 4 6 , S u b s e c t i o n 1 1 0 .

A p proval Is g r a n te d t o c o n d u c t y o u r stu d y a s d e sc r ib e d In y o u r p r o to c o l fo r o n e y e a r
from t h e a p p ro v a l d a t e a b o v e . A t t h e e n d o f t h e a p p r o v a l p e r i o d , y o u w ill b e a s k e d t o s u b m i t a
r e p o r t w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e i n v o l v e m e n t o f h u m a n s u b j e c t s in t h i s s t u d y .
y o u m a y r e q u e s t a n e x t e n s i o n o f IR B a p p r o v a l .

I f y o u r s t u d y i s s till a c t i v e ,

R e s e a r c h e r s w h o c o n d u c t s t u d i e s in v o l v in g h u m a n s u b j e c t s h a v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s a s o u t l i n e d in t h e
a t t a c h e d d o c u m e n t . R esp o n sib ilities o f D irectors o f R esea rch S tu d ie s In v o lv in g H um an S u b jec ts.
(T h is d o c u m e n t is a l s o a v a ila b le a t h t t p : / / w w w .u n h .e d u / o s r / c o m p lia n c e /I R B .h tm l. l P le a s e r e a d th is
d o c u m e n t c a r e f u l l y b e f o r e c o m m e n c i n g y o u r w o r k in v o lv in g h u m a n s u b j e c t s .
If y o u h a v e q u e s tio n s o r c o n c e rn s a b o u t y o u r s tu d y o r th is a p p ro v a l, p le a s e fe e l f r e e to c o n ta c t m e
a t 6 0 3 - 8 6 2 - 2 0 0 3 o r J u l l e . s l m p s o m a u n h . e d u . P l e a s e r e f e r t o t h e IR B # a b o v e in a ll c o r r e s p o n d e n c e
r e l a t e d t o t h i s s t u d y . T h e IR B w i s h e s y o u s u c c e s s w i t h y o u r r e s e a r c h .

ilie F . S i m p s o n
s g u la to r y C o m p lia n c e M a n a g e r
cc:

R le
A d v is o r/C o -In v e s tig a to r

Regulatory Compliance O ffice, Office o f Sponsored R esearch, Service Building,
5 1 C ollege Road, Durham, NH 0 3 8 2 4 -3 5 8 5 * Fax: 6 0 3 -8 6 2 -3 5 6 4
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In

d ia n a

u n iv e r sit y

s o u t h e a s t

INSTITUTIONAL. R E V IE W B O A RD M EM O
To:

Brian R. Laythe
1737 Elm Street East
New Albany, IN 47150

From:

Marcia T. Segal, chair

Subject

IRB #03.45

Date:

June 29,2004

CC:

Diane E. Wille, Psychology

^

'

“Communication and Resolution between Student Groups with Disagreements” IRB #03.45
Thank you for your memo of June 25,2004 responding to the mono of June 21,2004 from the
IRB indicating the changes required for approval of your protocol. Please note that on the
subject line and also in die line containing the tide of the project, dm protocol is referenced as
IRB # 03. 44. This is an error. The correct number for this protocol is IRB 03.45; the error was
mine. Please refer to IRB #03.45 in all future correspondence. In order to avoid confusion, I am
sending you a corrected copy of that earlier memo.
The information regarding the data-gathering instruments is now complete and you have made
the changes in the contact information in various {daces so that they are consistent
The file is now complete and the protocol has been approved. Please remember that all forms
and scripts used in the research must be identical to those approved as of this date.
Please notify the IRB prior to making any changes and to file a progress report no later than one
calendar year from the date of this approval.
Thank you for your cooperation with the review process.
034S.nb.wpd
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Michael R. Cunningham, PhD
Communication Dept
RE: 052.05 - Communication Between Student Organizations
Dear Doctor Cunningham:
The revised consent form for the above study, dated 1/27/05, has been received by the Human Subjects Protection
Program office and contains the changes requested in the Institutional Review Board (IRB) email letter of 1/26/05. The
following items have been approved:
•
•

Protocol dated 1/27/05
Revised informed consent dated 1/27/05

Your study now has final IRB approval. Please note that the IRB operates in accordance with ICH guidelines and is
further mandated by the Office of Human Research Protection (OHRP) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).

The study has approval through 1/31/06, when the approval expires. You should complete and return the
Progress Report/Continuation Request Form EIGHT weeks prior to 1/31/06, in order to ensure that no
lapse in approval occurs.
Federal regulatory agencies have indicated that studies must be re-approved by the IRB before the expiration date.
Otherwise, the approval will expire and no further subjects can be entered until the study is re-approved by the
Committee (study suspension). It is the investigator's responsibility to obtain re-approval, including any changes needed
in the consent form, prior to the expiration date.
Office of Research Approval
Please note that; as indicated on the Review Certification Form, if this study meets the definition of a sponsored activity,
a Proposal Clearance Form must be completed and filed with the Office of Grants Management (OGM) at the University
(502-852-6512). If a study has an industry sponsor, a Multi-institutional Research Application will need to be filed with
the Office of Industry Contracts (OIQ. In that case, separate approvals by the OGM, OIC and the IRB will be required
prior to activation of the proposed study.
The attached documents have been approved by the University of Louisville IRB. Please print these out for your use. No
further letters will be generated from our office.
Best wishes for a successful study.
Sincerely,

Norma I. King
Program Assistant Senior
UofL Human Subjects Protection Program
MedCenter One, Suite 200
501 East Broadway
(502) 852-5188

169

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

After review, IRB protocol #054-120-UL submitted by Brian Laythe from
the University of Louisville has been approved by the University of
Southern Indiana's IRB.
I can follow up with an "official notice” early next week. Please review
the comments below.
Thank you.
M. Heather Dragoo
Sponsored Research Specialist
Sponsored Research Office, WA 104K
University of Southern Indiana
8600 University Blvd.
Evansville, IN 47712
(812) 465-1126
mhdraooo@usi .edu
www.usi.edu/Qr8ires/oqsr.asD
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HUMAN SUBJECTS PROTECTION
PROGRAM OFFICE
University of Louisville
M ed C erter O ne, Suite 200
501 E Broadway
Louisville, Kentucky4Q202-1798

UWRSnYcfKXMLLE

Office:
Fax:

dare to be great

502-852-5188
502-852-2164

January 13, 2006

Michael Cunningham, PhD
Communications - University of Louisville
Louisville KY 40292
RE:

Study #062.05 - Communication Between Student Organizations

Dear Doctor Cunningham:
The continuation request for the above study was reviewed by the Chair of the Institutional Review
Board (IRB) through the expedited review procedure, according to 45 CFR 46.110(F)(8-9) and 21
CFR 56.110, since the continuing review of research previously approved by the convened IRB as
follows: where (0 the research is permanently closed to the enrollment of new subjects, all subjects
have completed all research-related interventions; and the research remains active only for long-term
follow-up of subjects. The study now has continued committee approval from 2/1/2006 through
1/31/2007.
The following items were reviewed and approved:
•
•

Progress Report, dated 1/5/06
Protocol and Synopsis, not dated

The committee will be advised of this action at their next full board meeting.
Please subm it a P rogress Report/Continuation R equest Form eight w eeks prior to 1/31/07, in
order to ensure that no lapse in approval occurs.
Best wishes for the continued success of your study. Please send all inquires and electronic
revised/requested Items to our office email ad d ress at hsDoofc4Mouisville.edu.
Sincerely,
f

Laura D. Clark, MD
Biomedical IRB Chair
LDC/nik
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